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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a massive influx of unaccompanied minors
(UMs)1 crossing the southern border.2 Under the Trump administration, migrant
children are being held in detention centers at unprecedented levels, with a fivefold increase in the last year alone.3 Without legal representation, UMs have little
to no capability to defend against removal charges and to advocate for any
existing statutory rights that they might have to remain in the United States.4
UMs need legal advocates to safeguard their constitutional and statutory rights.
The need for counsel is arguably greater now than ever as the Trump
administration experiments with the hostile immigration practice—characterized
as immoral by many religious leaders and inhumane by a bipartisan group of
former US attorneys5—of separating children from families at the border. The
1. In the United States, an unaccompanied minor is known as an “unaccompanied alien child”
(UAC) and is defined by Title 6 of the U.S. Code (“Domestic Security”) as a child who:
a) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
b) has not attained 18 years of age; and
c) with respect to whom – (i) there is no parent or legal guardian the in the United
States; or (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to
provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2018).
2. See Caitlin Dickerson, Detection of Migrant Children Has Skyrocketed to Highest Levels
Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/migrant-childrendetention.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcaitlindickerson&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&versio
n=latest&contentPlacement=54&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/3X3B-D559]; Jeff Mason, A
Snapshot of Immigration at the Border as of June 2017, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (June 29, 2017),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/a-snapshot-of-immigration-at-the-border-as-of-june-2017
[https://perma.cc/FSV4-8LQ9]. While total numbers of UM apprehensions are down from their peak of
close to 50,000 in 2014, numbers remain historically high, reaching 31,096 in 2017. See also Mason,
supra. According to the Office of Refugee and Resettlement (ORR), roughly thirty percent of UMs in
Fiscal Year 2017 were fourteen or under, and a growing percentage since 2012—now almost one third—
are
female.
OFFICE
OF
REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT,
FACTS
AND
DATA,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data [https://perms.cc/D7TF-GNUR].
3. See Dickerson, supra note 2.
4. For a humanitarian perspective analyzing the importance of counsel to the outcome of
removal proceedings against UMs, see Shani M. King, Alone and Unrepresented: A Call to Congress
to Provide Counsel for Unaccompanied Minors, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 332, 332–33 (2013). King cites to
relevant scholarship that exposes the numerous reasons why counsel is so crucial to the plight of UMs:
the vulnerability of children and their unfamiliarity with the legal process, their unfamiliarity with the
nature and consequences of immigration proceedings, the complexities of immigration law, counsel’s
ability to help minors navigate a complicated process, the increased likelihood of success when UMs
are represented, and the conditions of detention. Id. at 332–33, n. 3–8.
5. The Pope voiced agreement with U.S. Catholic Bishops who have termed the practice
“immoral.” Philip Pullella, Exclusive: Pope Criticizes Trump Administration Policy on Migrant Family
Separation, WORLD NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-popeinterview/exclusive-pope-criticizes-trump-administration-policy-on-migrant-family-separationidUSKBN1JG0YC [https://perma.cc/79S8-WDB9]. Recently, Cardinal Sean O’Malley stated that the
United States “now openly before the world [is] using children as pawns to enforce a hostile immigration
policy. This strategy is morally unacceptable and denies the clear danger weighing upon those seeking
our assistance.” See Travis Anderson, Cardinal O’Malley Criticizes Trump Immigration Policies, Says
Family
Separation
‘Terrorizes’
Children,
BOS.
GLOBE
(June
13,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/06/13/cardinal-malley-decries-trump-immigration-policies-
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administration has classified children separated from their families under this
policy as UMs.6 While the administration has since terminated this policy,
largely due to nearly uniform global public outrage,7 hundreds of UMs remain
separated from their families, even after a reunification deadline imposed under
a federal court order.8 Unfortunately, the Trump administration has routinely

says-family-separation-terrorizes-children/a0GpZ6Zomjbdx0nzDG3w4N/story.html
[https://perma.cc/75PP-MFPT]. Religious leaders from many faiths, including a coalition of white
evangelical groups previously supportive of President Trump’s policies, have uniformly denounced the
policy of separating children from families at the border. See Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Religious
Leaders are Denouncing Trump Immigration Policies, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/us/trump-immigration-religion.html [https://perma.cc/5V4X8A4Z]. In addition, a bipartisan group of former U.S. attorneys, in a letter to U.S. Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, urged Sessions to end the policy of separating children from families. See Alan Bersin et al.,
Bipartisan Group of Former United States Attorneys Call on Sessions to End Family Separation,
MEDIUM (POLITICS) (June 18, 2018), https://medium.com/@formerusattorneys/bipartisan-group-offormer-united-states-attorneys-call-on-sessions-to-end-child-detention-e129ae0df0cf
[https://perma.cc/4XKA-C576] (“It is time for you to announce that this policy was ill-conceived and
that its consequences and cost are too drastic, too inhumane, and flatly inconsistent with the mission
and values of the United States Department of Justice.”).
6. See Sarah Pierce, Far from a Retreat, the Trump Administration’s Border Policies Advance
its Enforcement Aims, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 2018), https://www.migrationp
olicy.org/news/far-retreat-trump-border-policies-advance-enforcement-aims [https://perma.cc/X9639TA2].
We know that at least 2,342 children were forcibly separated from their parents between May
5 and June 9. Undoubtedly hundreds more were taken from their parents before and since
then. These children have been reclassified as unaccompanied child migrants and as such,
have been placed into a special system, which includes being transferred to the custody of
the Office of Refugee Resettlement . . . .
Id.
7. A 2018 Quinnipiac survey found that 66% to 27%, voters oppose the policy of separating
children from their parents when families illegally cross the border into the United States. Among
Independents, only 24 % favor the policy, while 68% oppose it. Among whites without college degrees,
the heart of President Trump’s coalition, support stands at only 37%, with 52% opposed. See Stop Taking
the Kids, 66 Percent of U.S. Voters Say, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, QUINNIPIAC UNIV./
POLL
(June
18,
2018),
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2550
[https://perma.cc/THH3-ZXTM]; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking Migrant Children from
Parents
is
Illegal,
U.N.
Tells
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-migrant-children-families.html
[https://perma.cc/2KQN-NJVS] (discussing U.N. criticism of Trump policy to separate policies and
terming it “illegal”); William A. Galston, As Trump’s Zero-Tolerance Immigration Policy Backfires,
Republicans are in Jeopardy, BROOKINGS INST. (FIXGOV) (June 18, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/trumps-zero-tolerance-immigration-policy-putsrepublicans-in-jeopardy [https://perma.cc/S3LG-B3EZ] (discussing the political backlash over Trump’s
zero-tolerance immigration policy among both Democrats and Republicans); Devon Sanders, Amnesty
International Blasts Trump Administration’s Family Separations: “This is Nothing Short of Torture,”
CNN POLITICS (June 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/immigration-border-childrenseparation/h_808b0bd4caf0341d0db1547a29cb47bc [https://perma.cc/4HRJ-QXKA] (noting that
Amnesty International called President Trump’s immigration policy and implementation of such policy
“nothing short of torture”).
8. See Daniel Gonzalez, 416 Migrant Children Remain Separated Weeks After Deadline to
Reunite Families, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2018/09/13/separated-migrant-children-remain-united-states/1287860002
[https://perma.cc/DLG5-H488].
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disregarded the humanity of arriving young migrants, subverting the concept of
due process in favor of mass detention and deportation. For example, President
Trump recently tweeted:
We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country. When
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court
Cases, bring them back from where they came. Our system is a mockery
to good immigration policy and Law and Order. Most children come
without parents . . . 9
The mistreatment of UMs by the executive branch highlights a crucial need
for greater judicial safeguards. For UMs in removal hearings,10 a shift in focus
is needed in the search for appointed counsel—away from the statutory
provisions that guarantee the right to counsel, and toward the provision which
guarantees the right to a fair hearing. Recent scholarship has furthered
constitutional due process arguments in favor of appointing counsel for
immigrants in removal hearings,11 but courts have not yet accepted a

9. Ellen Cranley, Trump Tweets He Wants to Deport Illegal Immigrants ‘with no Judges or
Court Cases’—A Move that Would Violate Due Process, BUS. INSIDER (June 24, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-tweets-deport-illegal-immigrants-no-judges-court-cases2018-6 [https://perma.cc/URB7-ZENT].
10. Our focus in this article is on unaccompanied minors who are placed in removal
proceedings. Throughout this article, the terms “exclusion” and “deportation” appear, but these terms
were replaced with the term “removal” in 1996 with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018). Thus, when we cite decisions or
authorities that discuss representation for minors in deportation or exclusion proceedings, these should
be understood as being equivalent to current removal proceedings.
Unaccompanied minors from non-continuous countries who are apprehended or present at
a port of entry are always placed in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1232. Unaccompanied minors who
are from Mexico or Canada face a process somewhat analogous to expedited removal, and can be
removed without being placed before a judge unless they (1) have a possible asylum claim, (2) are
potential victims of trafficking, or (3) cannot make an independent decision to return to their country.
Id. If any of these conditions are satisfied, these children are processed as if they are from non-contiguous
countries. Id.
Also, per the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), because
unaccompanied minors are not currently provided with counsel in removal proceedings, unaccompanied
minors from continuous countries who apply for asylum do so in a process that is more appropriate for
children and is conducted by Asylum Officers who have received training on child interviewing and the
adjudication of children’s issues. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1232
(2012).
Importantly, the TVPRA’s authors understand that administrative proceedings, whether
done in lieu of or in parallel with removal hearings, may be just as complex, consequential, and
challenging for a minor to navigate as a contested hearing itself. Thus, while beyond the scope of this
article, many of the arguments presented herein apply to representation in encounters with immigration
authorities outside of the context of the removal hearing.
For a comprehensive review of the right to counsel outside of the removal context, see Emily
Creighton & Robert Pauw, Right to Counsel Before DHS, 32ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION LAW UPDATE
SOUTH BEACH (2011), reprinted in Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n (2011 ed.),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/right-to-counsel-before-dhs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BAY-MG3C].
11. See, e.g., Benjamin Good, A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 10 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 109, 127–48 (2014). For an analysis of the argument that unaccompanied children have a
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constitutional or statutory argument that appointed counsel is required for groups
of noncitizens or noncitizen minors to vindicate their right to a fair hearing in
immigration court.12 The courts have nonetheless dropped very real hints that
UMs, who are particularly vulnerable and impotent as a group, may prevail using
an argument grounded in the fair hearing provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA or 1952 Act).13
Statutory arguments that suggest that the McCarran-Walter Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952’s right to counsel provisions could have been
intended to include a right to appointed counsel have largely been overlooked
due to the statute’s phrasing. This Article, however, proposes a novel statutory
argument in favor of finding a categorical right to appointed counsel for UMs
using the INA’s fair hearing provision as the basis for this right. We provide the
historical framework behind the enshrinement of these two rights and then argue
that Congress never intended to preclude appointed counsel. We further propose
that the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) grants
UMs a positive liberty interest,14 and we use this statutory interest as the basis of
an original means of surmounting the Lassiter presumption that only a loss of
physical liberty requires appointed counsel. We conclude by positioning UM
removal hearings within the current landscape of the appointment of counsel
doctrine (appointment doctrine) to demonstrate an increased likelihood of
success in finding a categorical right to appointed counsel using the fair hearing
provision and the TVPRA as a positive liberty interest.
Part I lays the foundation for the rest of the Article: we propose that, for
particularly vulnerable groups like UMs, who cannot obtain a fair hearing in any
other way, the source of the right to appointed counsel emerges,
counterintuitively, from the full and fair hearing provision (rather than the right
to counsel provisions) of the INA.15 Tracing the statutory development of these
two due process provisions reveals that they were intended to strengthen due
process rights of undocumented immigrants. Indeed, Congress enacted the
provisions for wholly different reasons, and likely intended them to operate and
function independently. Thus, the best construction of the “right to counsel (at
no expense to government)” provision can best be understood as a minimum
due process right to counsel, see Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to be Heard: Voicing the Due Process
Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41 (2011). For a similar
argument under international law, see King, supra note 4; Brian Rowe, Note, The Child’s Right to Legal
Assistance in Removal Proceedings under International Law, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 747 (2010).
12. See, e.g., C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2018).
13. See Michael Kagan, Essay, Toward Universal Deportation Defense: An Optimistic View,
2018 WIS. L. REV. 305, 306 (2018); see also C.L.G.J., 880 F.3d at 1151 (Owens, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the majority’s decision to deny petitioner’s claim that the INA or the Due Process Clause
required appointed counsel to satisfy petitioner’s right to a full and fair hearing, but explicitly proposing
the possibility for a different outcome in the case of UMs).
14. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012).
15. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
[hereinafter 1952 Act or INA].
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threshold for the majority of undocumented immigrants. This language in no way
limits the implementation of additional safeguards—including appointment of
counsel—if needed to secure a fair hearing for vulnerable groups like UMs.16
Using the fair hearing provision as the vehicle for acquiring this right removes
the statutory stumbling block courts have grappled with since the inception of
the modern-day immigration framework: specifically, that the government is
statutorily precluded from appointing counsel.
In Part II, we embark on a plain text statutory analysis of the two due
process provisions at issue—the right to counsel and the right to a fair hearing—
and present two plain text arguments that build upon each other: first, that the
right to counsel provision does not preclude appointing counsel at government
expense when necessary; second, that the right to a fair hearing actually requires
that vulnerable groups like UMs be appointed counsel to vindicate their statutory
right to a fair hearing. We provide examples of unenumerated rights, such as
translation services and notice of certain other rights, that have been found by
courts to be integral in safeguarding other enumerated due process rights under
the INA.
Part III examines the appointment doctrine and its operation in criminal,
quasi-criminal, and civil cases. It discusses the importance of a physical liberty
interest in acquiring a categorical right to appointed counsel. It demonstrates how
a positive liberty interest, derived mainly from statutes rather than constitutional
law,17 may substitute for the loss of physical liberty normally required under
Lassiter—specifically, incarceration—to compel heightened due process
protection.
Finally, Part IV situates removal hearings for UMs within the landscape of
the modern-day appointment doctrine in an effort to offer a clear statutory path
for obtaining a categorical right to appointed counsel under the fair hearing
provision. If the courts interpret the right to counsel provisions as intended, the
fair hearing provision can likewise operate as it was intended: to provide the
flexibility inherent in the concept of fairness and to allow appointed counsel to
guarantee that fairness for vulnerable groups of litigants during a removal
hearing.
I.
THE ENSHRINEMENT OF TWO DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS
The INA, codified under Title 8, Chapter 12 of the U.S. Code, governs
immigration to and citizenship in the United States. Section 1229a governs

16. See J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2015). The argument that
the fair hearing provision required the court to appoint counsel for compromised groups was proposed
in J.E.F.M., although the court declined to hear statutory arguments for lack of jurisdiction.
17. We have borrowed from Professor Ann Woolhandler’s definition of “positive liberty
interest.” Ann Woolhandler, Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 811,
845 (2016).
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removal proceedings under the INA. Although this section contains a number of
important provisions, this Article will focus on the history of two enumerated,
independently operating, due process rights: the right to counsel, and the right to
a full and fair hearing. The latter right requires appointed counsel in the case of
UMs. These statutory due process provisions, however, are best understood in
the context of the normative constitutional due process rights of noncitizens more
generally.
While the Constitution distinguishes between the rights of citizens and
noncitizens in some respects (for example, the right to be free from racial
discrimination in voting and the right to run for federal elective office are
expressly reserved to citizens),18 all other rights in the Constitution were drafted
without citizenship restriction. The rights to due process and equal protection,
found in the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments, extend to all “persons.”19 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Due Process Clause applies to all
“persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here
is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”20 Due process rights apply with
equal force in removal hearings.21 James Madison himself, a proponent of natural
law theories, recognized that noncitizens had a duty to abide by the laws of the
United States and, in return, benefited from the protections offered under the
Constitution.22 Indeed, human rights laws have paralleled this prerogative.23
Thus, citizens and noncitizens alike have strong constitutional due process rights,
particularly in criminal cases, but also in civil cases when liberty interests are
jeopardized in ways akin to criminal cases. However, courts have not yet
accepted a constitutional due process argument to justify appointing counsel to
entire groups of litigants. With that understanding, we turn now to the meaning
of the two due process statutory provisions in question with the goal of

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; id. art. II, § 1; id. amend. 15. States or localities, however, can
enfranchise noncitizen residents. In contrast, the right to hold federal elective office is expressly reserved
to citizens alone.
19. Id. amend. 5, 14. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment, which outlines rights attaching in
criminal trials, and includes the right to an attorney, also extend broadly to “the accused.” Id. amend. 6.
20. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States . . .”)
(citations omitted).
21. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding that a noncitizen may not “be taken
into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard” because “[n]o such arbitrary
power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized”). Although we
focus our efforts on removal hearings in this Article, it is possible that the arguments we present apply
with equal force to UMs in removal hearings as well, since the TVPRA—in contrast to the INA—does
not distinguish between arriving aliens and those already present in the United States.
22. Honorable Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 801, 807 (2013) (discussing Judge Madison’s views on noncitizen rights under the Constitution
and its continuing impact on the due process rights of noncitizens today).
23. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., art. 7–11, 19, 20(1); see also G.A.
Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). (extending the right to due process, among others, to
nationals and non-nationals alike).
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identifying a novel statutory argument for appointed counsel in UM removal
hearings.
A. The Right to Counsel
This right is currently codified under Section 1229a(b)(4)(A), which states
that in a removal proceeding “the alien shall have the privilege of being
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.” Section 1362 reiterates this
right, stating that:
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any
appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such
removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege
of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such
counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.
The most recent set of provisions providing this right has been in effect since
January 5, 2006. However, these provisions have a long history, dating back to
the early 1900s. Further, these provisions have not always existed in their current
form but have developed substantially over time.
The starting point of this historical analysis is the Immigration Act of 1907
(1907 Act).24 Under this Act, any time a ship carrying undocumented immigrants
entered the United States, the ship and its passengers were subject to an
inspection by immigration officers.25 If an immigration officer determined that
an undocumented immigrant was not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled” to
enter into the United States, then that immigrant would be subject to an
examination before a board of special inquiry.26 If the board reached an
unfavorable decision, the undocumented immigrant was thereafter permitted to
appeal “through the commissioner of immigration at the port of arrival and the
Commissioner-General of Immigration to the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor.”27 Although the 1907 Act does not provide for the right of counsel during
such proceedings, these proceedings are the ancestral roots of removal
proceedings as we know them today.
The next significant successor to the 1907 Act was the Immigration Act of
1917 (1917 Act), which modified the appeals process.28 The 1917 Act left the
proceedings described in the 1907 Act largely unchanged, but it explicitly
provided that if an undocumented immigrant appealed to the Secretary of Labor

24. An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, Pub. L. No. 96, ch.
1134, 34 Stat. 898 (1907) [hereinafter 1907 Act].
25. Id. § 16.
26. Id. § 24.
27. Id. § 25.
28. See An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the
United States, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 Act].
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after an unfavorable result from the board of special inquiry, they would “have
the right to be represented by counsel or other adviser on such appeal.”29
Thus, a comparison of the 1907 and 1917 Acts suggests that the right to
counsel during removal proceedings was developed at some point between those
years. One method of determining whether that is the case and if so, why—would
be to consider the legislative materials that led to the creation of the 1917 Act.
Fortunately, such materials are in existence: the 1907 Act provided for the
creation of a Joint Commission on Immigration to “make full inquiry,
examination, and investigation . . . into the subject of immigration.”30 The
Commission’s reports, published in 1911, directly paved the way for the 1917
Act.31
The more-than-400-page report contains a number of statements from a
diverse group of organizations, both proponents and opponents to immigration,
outlining a variety of topics relating to immigration law at the time, including the
right to counsel.32 A quick glance at the table of contents reveals a statement
pertaining to the right to counsel issue: the “Statement of the American Jewish
Committee, the Board of Delegates on Civil Rights of the Union of American
Hebrew Congregations, and the Independent Order B’nai B’rith.” This statement
contains a relevant heading titled “The immigrant entitled to due process of law,”
with a subheading which reads in part, “The right of the immigrant to counsel
before boards of special inquiry should not be denied. . . .”33
The subheading does not contain any substantive text in its body; however,
it does point the reader to Point VII of exhibit B, a brief from In the Matter of
Hersch Skuratowski. The brief, which was prepared for argument before the
Honorable Learned Hand, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New
York, aims to support the petitioner’s case in a Habeas Corpus proceeding after
he had received a decision of exclusion by a board of special inquiry.34 In doing
so, the brief challenges a number of rules and practices used by the board of
special inquiry in the case. 35 Point VII of the brief deals specifically with the fact
that “[c]ounsel was improperly denied before the board of special inquiry and on
appeal.”36
Under Point VII, the brief makes a number of important revelations, the first
of which is that the right to counsel was already in existence at that time.37

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 16.
1907 Act, Pub. L. No. 96, § 39, 34 Stat. 898 (1907).
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1664.
IMMIGRATION COMM’N, STATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED BY
SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECT OF IMMIGRATION, S. Doc. No. 61-764
(1911) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT 764].
33. Id. at 142.
34. Id. at 160.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 173.
37. Id.
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Specifically, the brief cites “the Secretary’s regulations (Rule 18).”38 This rule
can be found in the Immigration Regulations and is titled “Appearance of
Attorneys.”39 Although the rule deals primarily with regulating the fees provided
to attorneys in immigration proceedings, the brief cites the rule in order to argue
that the rule’s existence clearly demonstrates that undocumented immigrants had
the right to some form of representation in these hearings.40 As such, the brief
argues that Section 25 of the Immigration Act of 1907, which states that “[a]ll
hearings before boards shall be separate and apart from the public,” cannot be
understood to mean that undocumented immigrants are not entitled to counsel.41
The brief makes two further arguments in support of the right to counsel at
immigration proceedings. First, the brief considers the fact that the 1907 Act
provides that the boards of special inquiry are required to keep records of “all
such testimony as may be produced before them,” and that it places the burden of
proof on the undocumented immigrant.42 According to the brief, because of these
two provisions, it is reasonable to assume that the drafters of the 1907 Act
intended for undocumented immigrants to have attorneys presenting such
testimony to meet this burden.43 Second, the brief cites a report by the Ellis Island
Commission of 1903, which expressly recommends that boards of special inquiry
“admit to their sessions . . . the representatives of the immigrant.”44
It is uncertain whether or not this brief, and the statement within which it
was contained, was the decisive factor in providing for the right to counsel in
immigration proceedings. Nevertheless, it certainly acts as a relevant source of
information for the development of this right and indicates that it was a
contentious issue at the time. Further, given that the 1917 Act included the right to
counsel45 only six years after the Immigration Commission Reports were
published indicates that this brief might explain how the right came to be
enshrined. Notably, while the 1917 Act allowed for the retention of counsel of
one’s choosing on appeal, another provision of the Act explicitly stated that the
right to counsel was prohibited in the underlying exclusion hearing.46
However, Congress, through the INA, would by midcentury attempt to
repeal the rule that barred legal representation at exclusion hearings. The INA
can be considered the foundation upon which the current immigration statutes are
38. Id.
39. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, IMMIGRATION LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF JULY 1,
1907, at 39 (1910), [hereinafter 1907 REGULATIONS].
40. See COMMISSION REPORT 764, supra note 32, at 173.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See the 1917 Act, Pub. L. No. 301. ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 886–87 (1917).
46. Immigration Rules of May 1, 1917, r. 15, subd. 2 (1917), in BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
IMMIGRATION LAWS 67–68 (6th ed. 1921) [hereinafter Immigration Rules of May 1, 1917],
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015049811485&view=1up&seq=4
[https://perma.cc/4GXH-99FA].
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based; this becomes particularly evident when comparing the language in the
original Act with the language existing in the statutes today.
Under the 1952 version of the INA, removal proceedings were governed by
section 242(b). Subsection 242(b)(2) expressly provided for the right to counsel,
stating that “the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings,
as he shall choose.” Section 292 further provided for the right to counsel, stating
that:
In any exclusion or deportation proceedings before a special inquiry
officer and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney general
from any such exclusion or deportation proceedings, the person
concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such
proceedings as he shall choose.
As with the 1917 Act, one method of determining how these provisions
came to be enshrined is to consider legislative history behind the 1952 Act. In this
case, such legislative history is provided by House Report No. 1365, dated
February 14, 1952.47 The report does not provide a pretext or reasoning for
implementing a right to counsel in removal proceedings, but it does provide an
interesting consideration.
The report states that the INA would bring seven “significant changes” to
immigration and naturalization laws.48 Among these seven changes, the report
notes under listed change seven that the Act “[s]afeguards judicial review and
provides for fair administrative practice and procedure.”49 Further, this listed
change specifically cites section 242, the section of the INA which deals with
deportation of aliens, and which delineates the right to counsel.50 Thus, although
the report does not explain why the drafters included these provisions in the Act,
it does identify that they constituted a major change to immigration law at the
time. Since then, the provision providing the right to counsel has only undergone
superficial changes, making minor alterations to the language.
Since the INA of 1952 was the first act to affirmatively state the privilege
to be represented by counsel, the “major change” to immigration law most
sensibly refers to the expansion of the right to counsel to immigrants in removal
hearings, rather than in reference to who shoulders the expense of
representation.51

47. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1653.
48. Id. at 1679.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (“[F]ederal immigration laws from 1891
until 1952 made no express provision for judicial review . . . .”). In contrast to this apportionment of
additional due process rights, vestiges of the 1917 Act’s rule, which prohibited retaining counsel in
certain proceedings, persist today in border inspections where the government still recognizes no
privilege of counsel. Service Upon and Action by Attorney or Representative of Record, 8 C.F.R.
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The INA also codified for the first time the right to counsel in removal
hearings. Prior to the 1952 Act, the privilege of being represented by retained
counsel had been guaranteed by regulation only.52 Thus, rather than viewing the
Act as a prohibition on Federal funding for counsel, it is better thought of as an
expansion and codification of the right to counsel in removal hearings.53
B. The Right to a Full and Fair Hearing
The right to a full and fair hearing is currently codified under section
1229a(b)(4)(B), which states that in a removal proceeding:
[T]he alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the
evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government
but these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such national
security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to
the alien’s admission to the United States or to an application by the
alien for discretionary relief under this chapter . . . .
The historical development of the right to a full and fair hearing follows a
much more gradual path than that of the right to counsel. In fact, traces of this
right can be found as early as the Immigration Act of 1891 (hereinafter the “1891
Act”).54 Under that act, undocumented immigrants entering the United States
were subject to examination by inspection officers.55 The 1891 Act explicitly
provided that, during such examinations, the inspection officers had the power “to
administer oaths, and to take and consider testimony touching the right of any
such aliens to enter the United States, all of which shall be entered of record.”56
However, the Act did not directly afford this right to undocumented immigrants,
but rather described it as a power held by inspection officers.57

§ 292.5(b) (exempting “any applicant for admission in either primary or secondary inspection [from]
the right to representation,” except in certain specified circumstances); CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL ch. 17.1(e) (2005) (applying 292.5(b) to individuals in
deferred inspections).
52. See Immigration Rules of May 1, 1917, supra note 46, at r. 22, subd. 5(b) (“The alien shall
be required then and there to state whether he desires counsel or waives the same . . . . If counsel be
selected, he shall be permitted to be present during the conduct of the hearing . . . .”).
53. Prior to 1996, deportation and exclusion were separate removal procedures, but the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) combined these procedures
into one proceeding called “removal.” Until this change, exclusion had been the formal term for denial
of an alien’s entry into the United States. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
As referenced above, we are discussing removal in this piece and all references to deportation and
exclusion should be understood to refer currently to removal. See supra, note 10.
54. See Pub. L. 51-551, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084a (1891) [hereinafter 1891 Act].
55. See id. § 8.
56. Id.
57. See id.
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The next step in the development of the right to a full and fair hearing is the
Immigration Act of 1903, which altered the records requirements.58 Unlike the
1891 Act, where all evidence was to be entered of record, under the 1903 Act a
written record of testimony before immigrant inspectors was only made “where
such action may be necessary.”59 Additionally, the appellate procedure was
altered, with the 1903 Act providing for an appeal to a board of special inquiry.60
Further, the Act provided that “[a]ll hearings before boards shall be separate and
apart from the public, but the said boards shall keep complete permanent
records of their proceedings and of all such testimony as may be produced before
them . . . .”61
Once again, the Act did not describe the provisions regarding testimony and
evidence as affirmative rights provided to undocumented immigrants, but rather
described them as powers held by the relevant authorities.62 As such, the
provisions do not discuss whether the undocumented immigrants were permitted
to present evidence or examine evidence and cross examine witnesses provided
by the government. However, the Immigration Regulations of 1907 later
provided some clarity on these issues.63
Rule 35(e) of the Immigration Regulations pertains specifically to the
procedure of removal hearings. According to the rule, during such hearings the
undocumented immigrants were “allowed to inspect the warrant of arrest and all
the evidence on which it was issued.”64 The rule also explains that if permitted by
the person before whom the hearing was being held, the undocumented
immigrant could be represented by counsel.65 Such counsel then had the right “to
inspect and make a copy of the minutes of the hearing so far as it has proceeded,
and to offer evidence to meet any evidence theretofore or thereafter presented by
the Government.”66 Whether this rule would be equally afforded to the
undocumented immigrant himself were counsel not permitted to appear is
unclear. Nevertheless, despite the fact that such provisions are not present in the
1907 Act itself, the regulations indicate that the presenting and examining of
evidence was a right that began to be afforded to undocumented immigrants at
the time.67

58. See An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, Pub. L. No. 57162, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903) [hereinafter 1903 Act].
59. Id. § 24.
60. Id. (“The decision of any such officer . . . shall be subject to challenge by any other
immigration officer, and such challenge shall operate to take the alien whose right to land is so
challenged before a board of special inquiry for its investigation.”).
61. Id. § 25.
62. See id. §§ 24–25.
63. See 1907 REGULATIONS, supra note 39.
64. Id. at 60.
65. Id. at 60–61.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id. at 60–61.
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However, even though these regulations were in force in 1907, ten years
later the 1917 Act did not affirmatively provide for any of these rights.68 In fact,
the 1917 Act left the relevant provisions of the 1907 Act largely unchanged. The
only substantial change under the 1917 Act was that commissioners of
immigration, and inspectors in charge, now had an explicit power to subpoena
witnesses and evidence.69
Following the 1917 Act, the next most significant step in the development
of these rights was the INA, enacted in 1952.70 As mentioned earlier, this Act can
be considered the foundation upon which the current INA is based. Under the
1952 Act, the right to a full and fair hearing was found in Section 242(b)(3),
which provided that “the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine
the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to crossexamine witnesses presented by the Government . . . .”
Unfortunately, House Report No. 1365 does not provide a pretext or
reasoning for implementing the right to a full and fair hearing. However, as
indicated earlier under the right to counsel analysis, the House Report indicates
that the section within which this provision was included constituted a
“significant” change to immigration law at the time.71 The fair hearing
requirement found in the 1952 Act was likely a response to the fact that the law
had, until then, been largely silent on proceedings for removal hearings72 and that
the Supreme Court had long recognized that the Due Process Clause requires fair
hearings in removal proceedings.73 The Senate Judiciary Committee report of the
1952 Act noted that the “constitutional guaranty” of due process had given rise to

68. See 1917 Act, Pub. L. No. 301, ch, 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
69. Id. § 16 (“Any commissioner of immigration or inspector in charge shall also have power
to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses . . . and the production of books,
papers, and documents touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the
United States . . . .”).
70. See 1952 Act, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 447, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
71. .R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1679.
72. See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 624 (1950) (Judiciary Committee report noting that the
deportation procedure “is not specified in the law”).
73. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950) (holding that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was, in fact, intended to cover to deportation hearings and that,
although deportation statutes did not specifically provide for hearings, hearings were required to save
the statute from constitutional invalidity). The Court states:
When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which
meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves
issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which
aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring up
to constitutional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings the
like of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less vital matters of
property rights are at stake.
Id. at 50–51; see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal before an individual alleged to be in the
United States illegally can be deported).
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several fair process regulations in immigration proceedings, and that the agency’s
failure to provide fair process “might invalidate the entire hearing.”74
Since then, Congress has left the provision largely unchanged, with only
minor changes made to the wording and the addition of a provision stating that
undocumented immigrants would not be entitled to national security
information.75
C. The INA Expanded Due Process Rights
Since the enactment of the INA, courts have used the right to counsel
provisions as evidence that Congress intended to preclude appointed counsel
altogether.76 But while the right to counsel “at no expense to government”
provision, at first glance, appears to serve as a limitation to the allocation of
federal funds for appointing counsel, it is better understood as creating a “floor”
that provides all people in removal proceedings the right to private counsel at
their own expense. The right to counsel in removal hearings had previously only
been found in regulation, and for the first time, it was explicitly codified in
statute.77 The elements of a fair hearing in a removal hearing—a reasonable
opportunity to testify on one’s own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses, and to
prepare a strategic defense—were itemized for the first time in the INA.
Moreover, the INA was passed after the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which had been enacted just six years earlier.78 Introduced by Senators Pat
McCarran and Francis Walter, the INA was intended to provide the same
underlying administrative protections that the APA had afforded to litigants.79
74. See S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 624.
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2018) (inserting the gender-neutral term “alien” in place of
“him” and changing the word “in” to “on,” presumably for clarity).
76. See El Rascate Leg. Serv. v. EIOR, 959 F. 2d 742, 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress
chose not to pay for the alien’s representation, however, so the Attorney General cannot ensure
protection of the alien’s § 1252(b)(3) opportunities by appointing counsel,” and “Congress expressly
instructed the Attorney General not to provide appointed counsel.”). But see Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813
F. 2d 283, 289 (9th Cir. 1987); Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, CV-1002211 DMG, at *28 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (“The Court agrees that [8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4) and
1362] cannot reasonably be interpreted to forbid the appointment of a Qualified Representative to
individuals who otherwise lack meaningful access to their rights in immigration proceedings . . . .”).
77. See generally discussion supra Part I.A.
78. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96
(2018)). The stated purpose of the APA is “to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair
administrative procedure.” Id.
79. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex and Futile Deportation Process of Carlos
Marcello, in IMMIGRATION STORIES, 113–46 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). One
year after Congress adopted a rider that explicitly exempted exclusion and deportation hearings from
the requirements of the APA in response to Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), which
found that the APA controlled in deportation hearings, Congress passed the INA, which contained
language that it be the “sole and exclusive” procedure for deportation proceedings. Kanstroom, supra,
121–23 (citing 1952 Act Pub. L. No. 414, § 242(b), 66 Stat. 163 (1952)). Three years later, the Supreme
Court got the opportunity to address whether Congress had intended for the INA to function
independently from the procedural requirements of the APA. Id. at 125 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349
U.S. 302 (1955)). The Court found that, indeed, Congress had so intended, relying on the following
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The procedural underpinnings of the rights to counsel and to a fair hearing have
both been found to echo those protections afforded under the APA—further
evidence that these provisions were intended to expand, rather than restrict, the
due process rights of immigrants.80
Further, these rights evolved independently81 from one another, suggesting
that they have an independent function and operation, and creating an
opportunity for a right to appointed counsel.82 Notably absent from the statute is
language restricting appointment of counsel where necessary, and nowhere does
the statute prohibit federal funding for appointed counsel. The language of the
fair hearing requirement, on the other hand, provides greater protection for
certain individuals who may require appointed counsel to safeguard their right
to a fair hearing. The Ninth Circuit has been the front runner in testing the
validity of this argument and in endorsing the need for enhanced due process
protections for litigants with diminished capacities.83
D. The Current Litigation Landscape
A small but significant subset of cases has begun to generate support for
the idea that appointed counsel for vulnerable groups is a precondition to
fairness. In Matter of M-A-M, the Board of Immigration Appeals laid out a 3part test for establishing the fairness of a hearing in the case of a litigant with an
intellectual disability.84 Determining competency required that the individual in
question be able to (1) have a rational and factual understanding of the nature
and object of the proceedings, (2) consult with the attorney or representative if
there is one, and (3) have a reasonable opportunity to examine and present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses.85 While M-A-M addressed adults, it
nevertheless provided a starting point for determining the need for additional
protections as a function of competency.86
Just a few years later, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder expanded on the idea that
a vulnerable class of immigrants could require heightened due process
factors to support its conclusion: the analogous and converging nature of APA and various INA
provisions, the laborious adaptation of the APA to the deportation process and specific points where
deviations were made, the legislative history which confirmed this adaptive technique and the specific
deviations therefrom, and the statutory verbiage which prescribed that the INA should be the “sole and
exclusive” procedure used for deportation proceedings. Id. at 125.
80. See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306–08.
81. See generally supra Parts I.A, I.B.
82. See generally supra Parts I.A, I.B.
83. But see C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1151 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the argument
for immigrant children in removal hearings generally but specifically suggesting in the concurrence that
this argument could succeed in the case of UMs).
84. Matter of M-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011).
85. Id.
86. While the suggestion here is that the case law applicable to adults with intellectual
disabilities has applicability to children, an important caveat is that we do not mean to equate adults with
intellectual disabilities with children. Rather, we focus here on the ability to observe, remember, and
communicate in a legal proceeding.
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protections to ensure their right to a fair hearing.87 The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of immigration detainees
in California, Arizona, and Washington who suffered from severe intellectual
disabilities and argued the class members were entitled to appointed counsel for
a variety of reasons. The court used the Rehabilitation Act88 as the basis for
requiring the government to appoint a Qualified Representative89 to all class
members to assist in immigration proceedings. The court rejected the argument
that statutes preclude the use of government funds for appointed counsel. In
doing so, the court relied on language from the General Counsel of the
Department of Homeland Security that supported a plain text reading of the
INA’s right to counsel provisions.90 The court never reached the constitutional
and statutory arguments made by plaintiffs that an unenumerated right
(appointed counsel) was a prerequisite to vindicating plaintiffs’ right to a fair
hearing. However, the court addressed the concern in dicta, advocating strongly
for the merit of the argument in response to the government’s contention that
providing a Qualified Representative would alter the fundamental nature of the
immigration statutory framework:
Plaintiffs do not seek relief from removal or automatic termination of
their proceedings. They seek only the ability to meaningfully participate
in the immigration court process, including the rights to “examine the
evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf,
and to cross-examine witnesses presenting by the Government.” 8
U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(B). Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise these rights is
hindered by their mental incompetency, and the provision of competent
representation able to navigate the proceedings is the only means by
which they may invoke those rights.91
The district court issued an order requiring the U.S. Government to
implement a comprehensive system for mental health screening of detainees
upon arrival to detention centers in California, Arizona, and Washington, a
87. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, CV-02211-DMG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
88. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 701–97b (2018), prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in programs conducted by federal agencies, in programs receiving federal financial
assistance, in federal employment, and in the employment practices of federal contractors.
89. “Qualified Representative” was defined by the court as “(1) an attorney, (2) a law student or
law graduate directly supervised by a retained attorney, or (3) an accredited representative, all as defined
in 8 C.F.R. Section 1292.1.” Franco-Gonzalez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *20 n.4 (citing
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
90. Franco-Gonzalez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *27–28. The court stated:
[W]riting on behalf of the Office of the General Counsel for the DHS, David P. Martin,
Principal Deputy General Counsel, confirmed that the plain language of Section 1362 does
not lend itself to the interpretation that it “prohibits the provision of counsel at government
expense” . . . The court agree[d] that these statutes cannot reasonably be interpreted to forbid
the appointment of a Qualified Representative to individuals who otherwise lack meaningful
access to their rights in immigration proceedings as a result of “mental incompetency.”
Id.
91. Id. at *21–22.
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competency evaluation system for members of the Class and an information
sharing system between DHS and Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR) of mental health information of Class members.92 If individuals are
found to be “mentally incompetent” to represent themselves, the EOIR must, in
these three states, arrange for a Qualified Representative to assist them.93
In the wake of Franco-Gonzalez, Plaintiffs in J.E.F.M. v. Holder presented
similar arguments on behalf of a class of unrepresented child plaintiffs, arguing
that government immigration agencies violated their Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights and their statutory right to a fair hearing under the INA.94 The UM
class contended that they were unable to exercise their statutory right to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses because they could not retain counsel and
were thus denied their constitutional right to due process of law.95 The court
determined that it had jurisdiction over constitutional but not statutory claims for
the limited purpose of denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, and engaged in a
cursory effort to balance the Mathews factors used to assess due process claims.96
The first Mathews factor, the nature of the liberty interest, weighed in favor of
plaintiffs because removal or a return to one’s homeland could be “the same or
worse than incarceration for some minor aliens.”97 The court decided the second
factor in favor of plaintiffs as well, suggesting that the risk of erroneous
deprivation was high for plaintiffs. The court relied on the improper removal
order for at least one named plaintiff as evidence for a high risk of error. Further,
it rejected the government’s assertion that plaintiffs’ ability to appeal was a
sufficient substitute for assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.98 The court
rejected this circular reasoning, noting that appeals are limited to the
administrative record, and the absence of an attorney greatly impacts the shape
and scope of that record.99
While the J.E.F.M. court did not rule on the merits of plaintiffs’
constitutional claim, it did suggest that UMs might have a better chance at
securing appointed counsel than other litigants have in recent civil appointment
cases decided by the Supreme Court. The J.E.F.M. court astutely noted that the

92.
93.

Id. at *62–69.
Id.; see also M. ARYAH SOMERS, PRACTICE ADVISORY: CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION
PROCEEDINGS: CHILD CAPABILITIES AND MENTAL HEALTH COMPETENCY IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY 7 (2015), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/children_in_immigration_proceedings__child_capacities_and_mental_competency_in_immigration_law_and_policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CR83-HFN2].
94. J.E.F.M. v. Holder, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015).
95. Id. at 1124.
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (providing courts with a set of factors to be
balanced in ascertaining the adequacy of due process protections in administrative hearings); infra
discussion at Part III.C.
97. J.E.F.M., 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
98. Id. at 1140–41.
99. Id.
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Supreme Court had left open two issues in a previous case:100 whether an
individual is owed more process when (1) the government is represented by
counsel and (2) the issues in the case are unusually complex. The court stated:
The right-to-counsel claim asserted by plaintiffs in this case falls
squarely within the intersection of the questions unanswered in Turner.
The removal proceedings at issue in this case pit juveniles against the
full force of the federal government . . . Moreover, courts have
repeatedly recognized “[w]ith only a small degree of hyperbole” that the
immigration laws are “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in
complexity.”101
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over all claims since the claims were not raised under the appropriate petition for
review (PFR) of a removal order.102 However, the court acknowledged the
improbability of a child adequately protecting their legal rights in a removal
hearing without representation and advocated that Congress has a “moral
obligation” to address the problem of children lacking counsel in removal
hearings.103 Jurisdictional issues aside, the prevailing legacy of J.E.F.M. is that
UMs have a good shot at prevailing under Mathews, and that the facts of a UM
removal case may create just the right factual scenario for a civil-Gideon
challenge104 after Turner.
Cases like J.E.F.M. have nudged UMs even closer to victory by espousing
arguments that a fair hearing cannot occur without appointed counsel. Based
largely on the enshrinement history in Part I, Part II accordingly proceeds under
the assumption that the right to counsel was not intended to qualify or limit the
right to a fair hearing for vulnerable groups who cannot secure a fair hearing
without legal advocacy. Part I unearthed and analyzed new evidence that the
right to appointed counsel for vulnerable groups like UMs can be found within
the fair hearing provision. Part II will now walk through a reading of the two due
process provisions to assess the feasibility of making a successful statutory
argument that UMs have a right to appointed counsel embedded within the fair
hearing provision of the INA.

100. In Turner v. Rogers, the issue presented was whether a defendant in a civil contempt case
(facing up to one year of prison time) should categorically be appointed counsel if he could not afford
one. The Court ultimately decided that a categorical right to counsel is not required under the Due
Process Clause, but hinted that scenarios presenting a legal power imbalance or a highly complex legal
issues might justify a different conclusion. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
101. J.E.F.M., 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (quoting Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
102. J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2016) (concurrences of Judges
McKeown and Kleinfeld).
103. Id.
104. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states must, under the Sixth
Amendment, provide attorneys to those accused of a crime to the extent they cannot otherwise afford
them).
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II.
PLAIN TEXT STATUTORY READING SUPPORTS APPOINTING COUNSEL WHEN
REQUIRED TO ENSURE A FAIR HEARING
Scholars have argued that there is a constitutional basis for the right to
appointed counsel to apply in removal proceedings, at least case-by-case.105
Some of the same scholars, though, have expressed deep skepticism regarding a
statutory basis for this right.106 The following Part challenges this general
cynicism: is it accurate to assume that an argument relying on a statutory basis
for the right to appointed counsel will necessarily suffer legal defeat? Moreover,
could knowledge of their independent histories and purposes assist in
strengthening a statutory argument? We use Jennings v. Rodriguez and Zadvydas
v. Davis as tools to guide statutory interpretation for the right to counsel and fair
hearing provisions.107 This section will show, first, that the INA’s right to
counsel (at no expense to the government) provisions do not preclude the use of
government funds to appoint counsel when necessary. Second, it is intended to
propose a workable statutory argument that UMs have a due process right to
appointed counsel subsumed within the fair hearing provision.
A. Supreme Court Guidance: Zadvydas and Jennings
The Zadvydas Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
interpret an immigration detention statute, § 1231(a)(6), which authorizes the
detention of individuals who have already been ordered removed from the United

105. Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for Appointed Counsel in Immigration Proceedings:
Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 921–26 (2016). Fatemi’s analysis concludes that
the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment stops short of requiring that immigrants qualify for
appointed counsel because their circumstances are not the same as those facing federal criminal charges.
Fatemi offers more hope for a Fifth Amendment basis for a right to appointed counsel, discussing the
existence of a circuit split. The Sixth Circuit was joined by the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits in
adopting the “fundamental fairness” test under Anguilera-Enriquez v. INS, which predicated
appointment on whether “the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide ‘fundamental
fairness[,] the touchstone of due process.’” Anguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568–70 (6th Cir.
1975) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). The Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits use a higher “harmless error” test and ask whether the existing procedural safeguards resulted
in prejudice that likely impacted the results of the proceedings. See Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F.
App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005); Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990)); Michelson v.
INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–07 (5th Cir. 1986).
106. Fatemi, supra note 105, at 919–21 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Off. of
Immigration Rev., 959 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 1991)) (observing congressional intent not to pay for the
immigrant’s representation); see Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that “the parenthetical in [§] 292 means only that the government has no obligation to appoint and pay
for the representation of aliens in deportation proceedings”), rev’d on other grounds by RuedaMenicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, Fatemi provides a good summary of the statutory
scope of—and limitations on—the right to counsel provisions of the INA, as well as the additional
protections afforded by the TVPRA (which stops short of providing appointed counsel) and § 504(c) of
the INA (Alien Terrorist Removal Court), which has not been used to date but explicitly provides for
appointed counsel. See Hill, supra note 11.
107. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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States.108 When an individual is ordered removed, the Attorney General, as a
general matter, “shall” remove the individual from the United States within a
period of 90 days.109 After this time period elapses, certain individuals “may” be
detained beyond the removal period, under 1231(a)(6).110 The Zadvydas court
held that a statute which allowed for indefinite detention would violate the Due
Process Clause, after finding that the word “may” in § 1231(a)(6) created
ambiguity, suggesting discretion but not necessarily unlimited discretion as to
the length of detention.111 The Court also pointed to the absence of any explicit
statutory limit on the length of permissible detention as further evidence of
ambiguity.112
More recently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court undertook an
intensive analysis of another detention statute, involving the detention of certain
individuals potentially subject to removal.113 The Court used a strict textualist
reading of the statutes to overrule the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance necessitated an interpretation of the detention statutes
that required bond hearings every six months.114 The Supreme Court found,
however that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was not supported by the statute
and that the court of appeals had therefore misapplied the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance.115 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that
detention was indefinite, and therefore constitutionally bereft, the Court found
that § 1225(b)(1) and (2) contained explicit text that limited detention periods.
In the case of the former provision, individuals “shall be detained for further
consideration of the application for asylum,” and in the latter, individuals “shall
be detained for a [removal] proceeding.”
The respondents argued that a “reasonableness limit” on the length of
detention116 must be read into the statute in order to save these provisions from
constitutional attack, but the Supreme Court firmly admonished this reading, as
well as their application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance:

108. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
110. Id.
111. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 697.
112. Id.
113. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). INA §§ 1225(b), 1226(a) and 1226(c) were
at play in Jennings. These provisions outline the government’s authority to detain certain categories of
individuals who are either seeking to enter the country (under § 1225(b)) or who are already in the
country (under § 1226(a) and (c)). 1952 Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
114. Id. at 837.
115. Id. at 836. The doctrine is a canon of statutory construction that attempts to “save” statutes
from constitutional problems. It reflects the concern that constitutional issues should not needlessly be
confronted, and also recognizes that members of Congress, like Justices of the Supreme Court, are bound
by their oath to uphold the Constitution. See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589,
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 24–25 (2014).
116. The respondents argued an alternative statutory construction: that a six-month limit on
detention must be imposed in order to save the statute from constitutional attack. Jennings, 138 S. Ct.
830 at 837.
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Spotting a constitutional issue does not give a court the authority to
rewrite a statute as it pleases. Instead, the canon permits a court to
“choos[e] between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory
text. . . .” To prevail, respondents must thus show that § 1225(b)’s
detention provisions may plausibly be read to contain an implicit 6month limit. And they do not even attempt to defend that reading of the
text.117
The Court chastised the court of appeals for “all but ignor[ing] the statutory text”
and instead reading the Zadvydas v. Davis precedent to “grant[] a license to graft
a time limit onto the text of § 1225(b).”118 Although characterizing Zadvydas as
a “generous application of the constitutional avoidance canon,”119 the Court
justified Zadvydas’s holding and application by surgically distinguishing the
statutory scheme there from the provisions at play in Jennings.
According to the Court, notable differences existed between the statutory
language in Zadvydas and Jennings. The Court highlighted the distinction
between the use of the word “shall” and “may” in the text, as well as the presence
or absence of language defining—and therefore limiting—the permissible length
of detention in each statutory scheme. Further, express exemptions to the
detention provisions at issue in Jennings provided additional justification for the
court to infer that there were no other circumstances under which individuals
detained under 1225(b) could be released.120
In light of Zadvydas and Jennings, questions remain about the right to
counsel and fair hearing provisions. Specifically, what is the plain text reading
of these provisions given evidence that both provisions independently evolved
and function? Second, and more importantly, can a plain text reading of these
provisions support an argument that subgroups, like UMS, require the assistance
of counsel to ensure UMs’ right to a fair hearing?
B. 1229a(b)(4)(A) Is Unambiguous
1. The Right to Counsel Provisions Do Not Refer to Appointed Counsel
The source of the right to appointed counsel is not found in the INA’s right
to counsel provisions at all. The INA twice refers to the right to counsel: under
8 U.S.C. Section 1229a(b)(4)(A) and again in 8 U.S.C. Section 1362. Both have
remarkably similar language and refer to the right to counsel as both a right (in
the statutory sub-heading) and a privilege (in the actual statutory text underneath
the sub-heading). Putting aside, for a moment, the classification as a right or a
privilege, the two sections are transcribed, respectively, below:
“the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 843 (parenthetical omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844.
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the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized
to practice in such proceedings”; and
“the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at
no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice
in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”
While it is not surprising that one would look to such provisions as the
source of a right to appointed counsel, as they both explicitly discuss the right to
an attorney, this overlooks that the text is focused on chosen representation. The
plain text makes it abundantly clear that this provision is not intended to be the
source of a right to appointed counsel and therefore it cannot operate to prohibit
appointed counsel at government expense where it is needed. Both provisions
make explicit reference to representation by counsel that is chosen by the
individual (in relevant part, Section 1229a(b)(4)(A) recites “counsel of the
alien’s choosing,” and Section 1362 similarly references “counsel . . . as he shall
choose”). Appointed counsel, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld,
involves no choice on the part of the defendant.121 The element of choice in both
provisions plainly signals that neither provision can refer to appointed counsel.122
If the provisions intended to provide for appointed counsel, they would
have communicated such a constitutional mandate with “right” instead of
“privilege.” This suggests that the enumerated right of chosen representation
does not refer to “appointed counsel” but rather serves as a clarification that
individuals are entitled to have chosen representation in removal proceedings,
such as border inspections, where attorneys are deliberately and explicitly
disallowed.123 That is to say, scholars may disagree on exactly what conditions
justify appointing counsel under due process standards, but once appointment is
deemed to apply, it certainly would be classified as a “right” rather than
“privilege.”
Finally, there is no merit to the argument that having a right to private
counsel without government expense somehow supports a sweeping prohibition
against government-funded appointed counsel. The Jennings Court warned
against reading limitations into a statute where no such limitations exist,
referring to this practice as “textual alchemy.”124 In fact, the Court provided a
lengthy counterargument to Justice Breyer’s dissent, which posited an alternative
meaning for the term “detain.” Referring to Justice Breyer’s meaning as a “legal
121. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006) (“[T]he right to counsel of
choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.”); see also Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
122. The Alien Terrorist Removal Court, which has not been used to date, however, does provide
for appointed counsel explicitly: “Any alien financially unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have
counsel assigned to represent the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2018).
123. See 8. C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (2019) (“[N]othing in this paragraph shall be construed to provide
any applicant for admission in either primary or secondary inspection the right to representation, unless
the applicant for admission has become the focus of a criminal investigation and has been taken into
custody.”).
124. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 at 846.
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equivalent of a sleight-of-hand trick,” the majority explicitly identified Breyer’s
interpretation of ‘detain’ as a “non sequitur,” stating: “Just because a person who
is initially detained may later be released, it does not follow that the person is
still ‘detained’ after his period of detention comes to an end.”125 Likewise,
limiting government expenses for legal representation in certain circumstances
does preclude the use of government funds for appointed counsel in others. In
fact, §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A) and 1332 make no mention of appointed counsel at all.
This interpretation would be tantamount to a re-writing of the statute.
2. Rights Under 1229a(b)(4)(A), (B), and (C) Are Distinct
As the Supreme Court and scholars have repeatedly noted, immigration law
is a complex legal specialty of its own.126 Congressional enactments relating to
immigration are replete with cross-references, making the body of law precise
but confusing. As an example, the criminal grounds for removal in the
immigration statutes is complex and contains multiple subsections, oftentimes
cross-referencing other statutory provisions which themselves contain multiple
subsections.127 With little doubt, Congress’s use of the cross-reference is
frequent and intentional. If Congress had intended to graft any funding
limitations from 1229a(b)(4)(A) upon 1229a(b)(4)(B), it could have readily done
so, as it frequently does elsewhere in the statutory scheme.128 The Court has
recognized that Congress speaks explicitly on issues when it has the intent to do
so, and applied an assumption that Congress will legislate on major issues
directly, rather than “hid[ing] . . . elephants in mouseholes.”129 If Congress had
intended for the government-funding limitation in subsection (A) to apply in
subsection (B), it would have explicitly so stated or used language to
unequivocally link the sections together.
Moreover, the three rights listed in Section 1229a(b)(4) contain no link or
cross-reference to one another, allowing an important inference to be drawn:
limitations found within the statutory text of one provision have no impact on—
or connection to—the statutory text of another and, accordingly, have no ability
to constrain its operation. Thus, with respect to Section 1229a(b)(4), subsection

125. Id. at 849.
126. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); Castro-Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d
1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (referring to the INA as “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in
complexity”) (citing ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF ALIENS 107 (1985)); Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 414–17 (2000).
127. Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them
and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 933, 941–42 (2015).
128. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1571 (2017) (noting that the INA
explicitly cross-referenced certain federal criminal statutes to define certain terms in the statute, but did
not cross-reference criminal statutes to define the age of consent for sex abuse of a minor; thus, the
federal criminal statute could not be relied upon exclusively to define the term).
129. EIG, supra note 115, at 18 (quoting Whitman v. Adm’r. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S.
457, 468 (2001)).
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(B) operates independently from subsection (A). The two subsections are
grouped together only as a list of required rights for individuals in a removal
proceeding. Subsection (A)’s limitation that the government will not be obligated
to pay for an individual’s choice of a private attorney does not similarly restrict
any other listed provisions. Thus, accommodations potentially required to ensure
an individual’s right to a fair hearing under subsection (B), such as the
appointment of counsel, are not constrained by subsection (A).
As an alternative to the cross-reference technique, Congress could have
organized the statute differently. Had Congress intended government funding
restrictions from subsection (A) to be superimposed on subsection (B), it could
have organized the statute in a way to make this apparent. Congress could have
easily changed the organization slightly by incorporating the right to counsel
provision as a subsection of the right to a fair hearing, instead of as a standalone
right, distinguishable from and unrelated to the others.130 On its face this appears
trivial, but it would have yielded significant interpretative differences.
Notwithstanding the fact that the language still would reference private, not
appointed, counsel, perhaps a better argument could be made that Congress had
intended to create a substantive limitation on the parameters of the fair hearing.
But this is not how the text is arranged or drafted; as such, “courts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there,” and thus “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this
first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”131 Further, the
provision and the statute’s general purpose—to broaden the due process
protections for noncitizens—is consistent with the interpretation that Congress
did not intend to limit government funding for appointed counsel to ensure a fair
hearing.132
3. Use of the Word “Shall” Supports Unambiguous Reading
Jennings and Zadvydas can be distinguished, in large part, due to
Congress’s word choice: the use of the word “shall” in Jennings evidenced a
clear congressional intent to detain all individuals falling within a certain
category until a certain event occurred (“further consideration of the application
for asylum” under 1225(b)(1), or “a [removal] proceeding” under 1225(b)(2)).133

130. Thus, a hypothetical statute could read:
(4) Alien’s Rights in Proceeding . . .
(A) the Alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine . . . the evidence against the
alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government . . .
(1) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government,
by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings, and
(B) a complete record shall be kept of all testimony and evidence at the proceeding.
131. Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., S. REP. 81-1515, 624 (1950).
133. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 (2018).
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The implication was that detention must continue until the end of the specified
event. In Zadvydas, on the other hand, use of the word “may” suggested a degree
of discretion.134 1231(a)(6) states that, after a removal order has been issued, the
Attorney General has 90 days to effectuate this removal, during which time the
individual must be detained.135 After this period, however, certain individuals
(falling within 1231(a)(6)) may be detained if they meet certain criteria.136 The
ambiguity in Zadvydas thus ensued largely from the use of the word “may,”
which suggests discretion, but not unlimited discretion. Conversely, the
provisions at issue here consistently make use of the word “shall,” which
“usually connotes a requirement.”137 The Attorney General thus has no discretion
but is instead required to provide all individuals in removal hearings a fair
hearing under 1229a(b)(4)(B). Since a textual reading has shown that no similar
federal funding limitations exist for Section 1229a(b)(4)(B) as exist for Section
1229a(b)(4)(A), appointment of counsel is one plausible way of satisfying the
fair hearing requirement for subgroups who cannot get a fair hearing any other
way. Further, Congress envisioned only one exception to the rights listed under
the fair hearing provision, restricting the right to examine evidence against a
noncitizen that relates to national security information. Under the doctrine of
“expressio unis est exclusio alterius,” the enumerated exception to the fair
hearing requirement seems to suggest no other exemptions were intended.
C. “Reasonable Opportunity” Under 1229a(b)(4)(B) Presents the Only
Potential for Ambiguity
Having established that the plain text of the statutory provisions at play
places no funding limitations on the fair hearing requirement, the only question
that remains is this: What constitutes a “reasonable opportunity” for UMs to
obtain a fair hearing? At this juncture, congressional intent becomes less
obvious. To be certain, the addition of the word “reasonable” before
“opportunity” provides some clue as to Congress’s intent: a degree of flexibility
according to individual circumstances must have been envisioned, or the
standalone term “opportunity” would have sufficed.138
A cardinal rule of construction for textualist analysis is that the whole
statute should be used as necessary, with various provisions being interpreted
within its broader statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory
purposes.139 One could try to infer Congress’s intent by looking to other
134. Id. at 843.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 844.
137. Id. at 16 (quoting Kingdomware Tech. Inc. v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016)).
138. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used
two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”) (rejecting
interpretation that would have made “uses” and “carries” redundant in statute penalizing using or
carrying a firearm in commission of offense).
139. See EIG, supra note 115, at 4.
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provisions of the statute: did Congress provide additional safeguards for
vulnerable groups elsewhere within the statute?140 Under section 1229a,
individuals with intellectual disabilities are given special accommodations when
they cannot be physically present at their removal hearings, and this provision
instructs the “Attorney General [to] prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and
privileges of the [mentally incompetent] alien.”141 Congress certainly recognized
that individuals with minimal capability to understand and utilize their rights
may require additional accommodations. Courts have likewise considered
Congress’s instruction regarding the limited proficiencies of compromised
groups and have in turn answered the call to provide additional due process to
accommodate such deficiencies.142
As in Zadvydas, legislative research to determine congressional intent
underlying the term “reasonable opportunity” would help to inform this
inquiry.143 The judicial contours of “reasonableness” have, as the next Part
considers, been sculpted throughout the years and, in the process, courts have
expanded the scope of due process by incorporating unenumerated rights as a
means of ensuring fundamental fairness. After all, the sine qua non of due
process is the flexibility to dispense “such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.”144 This procedural flexibility was arguably
codified by Congress’s choice of the term “reasonable opportunity.”
Here, that flexibility creates a lower limit with room for more protections
when needed. Section 1229a(b)(4)(A) describes legal representation as a
“privilege” and makes it clear that it applies to all people in removal proceedings
(and in appeals as well). However, nothing in this text precludes other sections
of the Act from affording greater protections for certain subgroups of
noncitizens. In other words, the right to counsel provision creates a lower limit
for all litigants in removal proceedings, and the right to a fair hearing provision
creates supplemental due process rights for certain vulnerable groups who need
more protection in the form of appointed counsel. When an entire class of
litigants is unable to make use of their right to a fair hearing because they cannot
140. In fact, courts have suggested as much. In Matter of M-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 481–82,
& n.2 (B.I.A. 2011), the Board of Immigration Appeals suggested that UMs have limited capacities and
may, as a group, fall within the category of “incompetent” and thus require additional safeguards in the
form of altered courtroom procedure. It states, “Immigration Judges already alter or tailor the conduct
of hearings in response to a respondent’s limited capacity, such as in proceedings involving
unaccompanied minors.” Id.
141. 28 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(3) (2012).
142. See, e.g., Matter of M-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481–82 & n.2 (acknowledging that children
may have limited capacities and that Immigration Judges have discretion to accommodate children’s
limited capacities by adjusting hearing procedures); see also Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, CV-02211DMG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *12–13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
143. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Court relied on United
States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), which discussed legislative history indicating Congress had
expressed doubts regarding the constitutionality of detention for longer than six months. Thus, the court
inferred that Congress intended a “reasonable” length of detention to mean six months or fewer.
144. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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understand the proceedings against them and therefore cannot present any
meaningful defense to charges brought, the hearing cannot be deemed “fair”
under Section 1229a(b)(4)(B), and other accommodations must be made to level
the playing field and provide them access to this right.145 The guarantee of a fair
hearing is reduced to a hollow charade for UMs who cannot leverage this right
without assistance: their impotence parallels the plight of paraplegic plaintiffs in
Tennessee v. Lane who had a Fourteenth Amendment due process right of access
to the courts but could not physically get to the higher levels of the courthouse
because they were wheelchair-bound and the building had no elevator.146 UMs
cannot understand proceedings against them to sufficiently advocate on their
own behalf and therefore require appointed counsel to ensure their statutory right
to a fair hearing.
Grafting heightened requirements onto the fair hearing provision has
certainly been done before and, in practice, gives meaning to the concept of a
“reasonable opportunity” in the context of a removal hearing. Thus,
§1229a(b)(4)(A) has been found to contain unenumerated rights when these
rights are necessary to vindicate enumerated rights. For example, while the fair
hearing provision of the INA does not mention translation services per se,
immigration courts and federal courts alike have found that a hearing requires
some translation services to ensure fairness.147 In Perez-Lastor v. INS, the court
created a threshold for the fairness calculus, stating that, for the proceeding to be
fair, it “must be translated into a language the alien understands.”148
Chronologically paralleling the Perez-Lastor decision, the Clinton
administration in the late 1990s concluded a major initiative to provide Limited

145. See, e.g., Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 888–94 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that an asylum
applicant who is not allowed to testify as to the contents of his application, detailing the abuse he endured
in his home country, did not receive a fair hearing); see also Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d
919, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where an alien is given a full and fair opportunity . . . to present testimony
and other evidence in support of the application, he or she has been provided with due process.”); Shoaira
v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 2004) (“For a deportation hearing to be fair, an IJ must allow a
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence and present witnesses.”).
146. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding Congress did not exceed congressional
authority under U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and therefore affirming the denial of the state’s claim of sovereign immunity). Two paraplegics
sued the state of Tennessee when it failed to make the state court system equally accessible to all. The
Supreme Court found that the right of access to the courts was a fundamental due process right under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)
(2018) (stating its purposes as: “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”). The ADA Amendments of 2008
stated Congress’s finding that “physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to
fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are
frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove
societal and institutional barriers.” Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009).
147. See Matter of Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 1987) (“The presence of a competent
interpreter is important to the fundamental fairness of a hearing.”); see also Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208
F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).
148. Perez-Lastor, 208 F.3d at 778.
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English Proficiency (LEP) individuals meaningful access to government
agencies and federally funded services. This initiative culminated in an
Executive Order requiring federal agencies to draft guidelines to ensure
compliance with Title VI requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited recipients of federal funding from engaging in discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, color, or national origin.149 Since language is typically a
proxy for national origin, Title VI has been held to protect LEP individuals from
discrimination on the basis of language.150
Although translation services offer some protection to demystify
proceedings, the scope of this protection is surprisingly limited. Most
jurisdictions require interpreters in immigration proceedings to translate only
questions asked directly to—and answers given by—respondents;151 the rest of

149. Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50, 121 (Aug. 11, 2000). The Executive Order is based
on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to -d7 (2018). The DOJ was tasked
with implementing this order and issued guidance to other agencies identifying four factors to be used
in determining the nature and scope of Title VI obligations with respect to LEP individuals: (1) the
number or proportion of LEP individuals who are eligible to be served by the program; (2) the frequency
of contact that LEP individuals have with the program; (3) the nature and importance of the program to
LEP beneficiaries; and (4) the resources available to accommodate these needs. Enforcement of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—National Origin Discrimination Against Persons with Limited
English Proficiency: Policy Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. 50, 123 (Aug. 16, 2000). Following further revision,
final DOJ guidance was issued on June 18, 2002. Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients
Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English
Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41, 455 (June 18, 2002). For a discussion of the scope and limits of
President Clinton’s LEP initiative, see Muneer Ahmed, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across
Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1016–19 (2007).
150. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that the San Francisco Unified School
District violated Title VI by failing to provide adequate instruction for LEP children of Chinese descent).
But cf. Franklin v. District of Columbia, 960 F. Supp. 394, 432 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing Title VI
claims of Hispanic inmates who were disqualified from certain prison programs because disqualification
was the result of limited English proficiency rather than race, color, or national origin). For further
discussion of related caselaw, see JANE PERKINS, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
ENSURING LINGUISTIC ACCESS IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4
n.19 (2d ed. 2003).
151. The practice of providing partial interpretation in immigration court proceedings, unless the
immigration judge determines that full interpretation is necessary, has survived due process challenges.
See El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the policy of partial interpretation is facially constitutional under the Due Process Clause
but remanding for other reasons). At least one court has implicitly found the practice of partial
interpretation to violate due process, but it refused to order any relief for the violation. See Tejeda-Mata
v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726–27 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding implicitly that the immigration judge’s refusal to
permit simultaneous interpretation of testimony against a noncitizen in deportation proceedings violated
the Due Process Clause, but that the violation constituted harmless error). The Board of Immigration
Appeals has revealed pragmatic concerns regarding the provision of translation services:
Although an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings is entitled to a fair hearing, we do
not find that due process requires translation of the entire hearing. In most cases, all that need
be translated are the immigration judge’s statements to the alien, the examination of the alien
by his counsel, the attorney for the [Immigration and Naturalization Service], and the
immigration judge, and the alien’s responses to their questions. However, the immigration
judge may determine, in the sound exercise of his discretion, that the alien’s understanding
of other dialogue is essential to his ability to assist in the presentation of his case. For
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the proceeding is largely a mystery to individuals whose very lives often lie in
the balance. Individuals in immigration proceedings need accommodation
beyond literal statutory boundaries to ensure a fair hearing.
Under 1229a(b)(4)(B), courts have also found that timely production of
adverse evidence is an implicit aspect of the right to a fair hearing. The
Bondarenko court found that a “reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence”
presumed that evidence must be disclosed to individuals in immigration
proceedings to ensure their right to a fair hearing.152 Immigration regulations also
require that notice of the right to counsel be given to individuals in removal
hearings.153 Effectively, where there had been only one enumerated right under
the INA (the right to counsel), regulations have created an additional
unenumerated due process right—the right to be made aware that one has a right
to counsel. This regulation reflects an implicit understanding that a right is
ineffective without knowledge that one possesses it.
The right to a fair hearing is similarly impaired when individuals cannot
effectively participate in it. Just as the rights to a fair hearing and to asylum have
narrow use and little value without additional due process protections such as
adequate notice procedures and interpretation services, the right to a fair hearing
for UMs goes wholly unclaimed without the right to appointed counsel when
necessary. A hearing is inherently unfair without proper accommodations where
(1) an unaccompanied child lacks cognitive and emotional skills due to their
young age, and (2) because of this cannot exercise statutory rights, including the

example, where a witness testifies regarding factual matters which specifically relate to the
alien’s own testimony, effective cross-examination may necessitate translation of the
witness’s testimony. On the other hand, arguments presented by counsel and the rulings of
the immigration judge are primarily legal matters, the translation of which generally would
not be required where the alien is represented and the protection of his interests is ensured by
counsel’s presence.
Matter of Exilus, 18 I. & N. Dec. 276, 281 (B.I.A. 1982) (citations omitted); accord Matter of Tomas,
19 I. & N. Dec. 464 (B.I.A. 1987) (finding that, where respondents are not fluent in English, the presence
of a competent interpreter is essential to assure fundamental fairness, particularly in phases of the
proceeding that require the respondents’ meaningful participation).
152. Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Cinapian v. Holder, 567
F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009)) (holding that DHS’s failure to disclose forensic reports in advance of
a hearing or to make the author available for cross-examination and the IJ’s subsequent consideration of
the reports denied the petitioners a fair hearing). But cf. Lyon v. ICE, 171 F. Supp. 3d. 961, 977 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (“[T]he INA does not expressly address the process of gathering . . . evidence. Neither the
language of the statute (which provides only for the reasonable opportunity to present evidence) nor any
existing case precedent cited . . . supports [an] expansive reading of the INA that would provide for a
general right to investigate and gather evidence in advance of and in preparation for a removal hearing.”)
(emphasis in original).
153. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10(a)(1)–(3) (2019) (“[T]he immigration judge shall: (1) Advise the
respondent of his or her right to representation . . . and require the respondent to state then and there
whether he or she desires representation; (2) Advise the respondent of the availability of free legal
services . . . located in the district where the removal hearing is being held; (3) Ascertain that the
respondent has received a list of such programs.”).
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rights to testify, cross-examine witnesses, and execute strategic determinations
necessary in a case.154
There are other instances where courts have effectively created a previously
unrecognized and unenumerated right to vindicate an enumerated statutory right.
DHS was recently ordered to adopt and implement uniform procedural
mechanisms to give individuals in DHS custody adequate notice of a one-year
asylum time limit to ensure that they could file for asylum in a timely manner.155
In a decision reminiscent of Miranda v. Arizona,156 the Western District of
Washington in Mendez Rojas v. Washington effectively grafted an unenumerated
right directly onto asylum statutory provisions, safeguarding the right to asylum
by mandating explicit and uniform notice procedures for a vulnerable group of
litigants.157
The examples above illustrate that noncitizens in removal proceedings have
very real due process rights, that these rights extend far beyond the bare statutory
rights itemized in the INA, and that the accompanying rights to notice and access
are often implied in statutory due process rights. An enumerated statutory right
without the power to access it or the notice that one indeed possesses it has little
practical value, but instead frustrates congressional intent by denying UMs the
very statutory rights conferred upon them under the INA and the TVPRA.158
For UMs as a class of noncitizen, the right to a fair hearing guaranteed
under § 1229a(b)(4)(B) cannot be vindicated without appointed counsel paid for,
when necessary, by the government. This right to appointed counsel is the only
means of ensuring that UMs’ opportunity to defend against removal charges rises
to the standard of reasonableness created by Congress. This need for appointed
counsel could be mitigated by the holding, adopted by some circuits, that
Immigration Judges have an affirmative obligation to fully and fairly develop the

154. Even though the Ninth Circuit ultimately denied a minor petitioner’s claim that the fair
hearing provision of the INA or the Due Process clause create a categorical right to appointed counsel
for minors as a group, Judge Owens, concurring, contemplated the likelihood of a different outcome
resulting from the special circumstances faced by UMs. See C.J.L.G. v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 1122, 1151
(9th Cir. 2018).
155. Mendez Rojas v. Johnson, 305 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1188 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2018). With
limited exceptions, an individual must apply for asylum within one year of the date of the immigrant’s
arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B) (2018).
156. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 498 (1966) (holding that notice of one’s Fifth
Amendment rights must be given prior to police interrogation to adequately safeguard these rights, and
discussing the “fundamental” nature of one’s Fifth Amendment right to the system of constitutional rule,
as compared with the simplicity of providing adequate notice of that right).
157. In Mendez, the court explicitly relied on the vulnerable nature of those applying for asylum
in requiring a uniform procedure for providing asylum rights. The court stated that the compromised
nature of those seeking asylum was an important consideration in this case, since litigants “ha[d] suffered
severe trauma, d[id] not speak English, [we]re unfamiliar with the United States’ complicated
immigration legal system, and d[id] not have access to counsel.” Mendez, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
158. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1232
(2018) (strengthening federal human trafficking laws and adding provisions to govern and protect
unaccompanied children entering the United States).
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record for appeal, particularly for pro se litigants.159 Nevertheless, the
expectation that one individual could simultaneously play the role of advocate,
factfinder, and arbitrator seems questionable at best.160 No amount of
impartiality on behalf of a decision maker could overcome the many
disadvantages faced by UMs: their young age; their unfamiliarity with the
English language and U.S. customs more generally; the complexity of
immigration law; the lack of an advocate, family member, or friend;, and the
reality that many UMs have experienced a high degree of physical or
psychological trauma.
Considering the severity of the consequence for those affected, UMs
deserve every opportunity to pursue and potentially succeed in each claim they
can advance.161 Part III will therefore be guided by the following inquiry: When
does a hearing require appointed counsel in order to make it fundamentally fair?
Part III traces the development of the appointment doctrine over the past century,

159. See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that immigration judges are
obligated to fully develop the record in those circumstances where applicants appear without counsel);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (providing that the IJ “shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses”).
160. See Sarah Sherman-Stokes, No Restoration, No Rehabilitation: Shadow Detention of
Mentally Incompetent Noncitizens, 62 VILL. L. REV. 787, 812–15 (outlining how the role of the IJ has
evolved over time in an effort to imbue the role with additional impartiality, but acknowledging the
lingering questions that persist in spite of these attempts); id. at 814 n.145 (compiling related scholarship
addressing the need for further reform relating to the impartiality of IJs).
161. The constitutional and statutory due process rights of UMs should be thought of distinctly
and be parsed liberally in order to fully explore and exhaust all distinct claims for fair process. Failure
to bifurcate statutory and constitutional lines of argument and to dissect differences that result from each
line may result in critical miscarriages of justice, particularly in the case of vulnerable groups like UMs
who have heightened statutory rights under the TVPRA. For UMs, given their inherent vulnerabilities
and the congressionally fortified statutory scheme designed to protect them, an independent examination
of the statutory and constitutional underpinnings of a right to a fair hearing has the potential to yield real
differences in outcome. Even if INA provisions were designed to be exactly coextensive with
constitutional due process protections, UMs’ unique circumstances—in conjunction with real
differences in circuit-court approaches, constitutional interpretations, and eventual outcomes—result in
patchy, conflicting holdings and uncertainty for litigants. This state of uncertainty is likely to persist
while appeals courts wait for the Supreme Court to take on a case which will create more uniform
standards and guidelines. At least one recent case has engaged in the multifaceted and thornier process
of teasing out statutory and constitutional arguments; in so doing, the court acknowledged, first, the
singularity of arguments originating in statutory versus constitutional rights, and, second, that distilling
these distinct lines of argument can truly be outcome-determinative. Lyon v. ICE, 171 F. Supp. 3d 961
(N.D. Cal. 2016). The court construed the statutory language under both Section 1229a(b)(4)(A) and
(B) narrowly, refusing to hold that limitations on detainees’ ability to make phone calls to attorneys
amounted to a denial of counsel under the statute, or that the right to a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence included a more expansive right to gather evidence. Id. at 974–77. However, the court found
that noncitizen detainees had a Fifth Amendment right to a full and fair hearing, which included the right
of access to counsel. This access was found to be implicated by government regulations that limited
telephone calls to counsel, particularly for detainees in Lyon, who were not in close physical proximity
to their attorneys. Id. at 981 (“Plaintiffs contend that phone conditions have impaired their right to gather
and present evidence in defending themselves against the government’s effort to deport them. In this
context, detainees have a Fifth Amendment guarantee to a full and fair hearing and this includes access
to counsel (of their own choosing).”) (emphasis in original).
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creating a “roadmap” to help identify the trends and factual scenarios that justify
appointing counsel to ensure a hearing’s fairness in cases arising under the Fifth,
Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, Part IV positions removal hearings
for UMs on this roadmap, even though they do not seem to fit comfortably into
any one approach or factual scenario. These parts provide what we deem to be
the best way of arriving at a categorical statutory right to appointed counsel based
on a positive liberty interest and the weighing of the factors identified and
repeatedly stressed in the caselaw.
III.
WHEN DOES A HEARING REQUIRE APPOINTED COUNSEL TO ENSURE
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS?
The appointment doctrine first emerged in the context of criminal trials,
mainly because of concerns relating to an imbalance of power and knowledge at
trial combined with the potential for a significant impairment of personal liberty
in the form of prison time. The doctrine has evolved over the past century,
gradually expanding into the realm of the modern administrative state, where the
rules for its application, under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, are
considerably more blurred.162 Part III examines caselaw in the criminal, quasicriminal, and civil contexts to identify the factors that sway a court to justify a
holding that a categorical right to appointed counsel is warranted. As this part
will show, the Sixth Amendment rights have traditionally been easier for the
court to rationalize since the loss of a liberty interest (due to penal
institutionalization) is clear. Even cases that fall outside of the purview of the
Sixth Amendment use the same general criteria to determine whether a hearing
requires appointed counsel to ensure fairness. However, courts grapple
extensively with the scope of this right under the 5th Amendment.

162. While immigration statutes deal exclusively with federal issues and are therefore
unequivocally subject to federal law, cases included in the following discussion address rights emerging
from the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Under federal law, these rights arise directly from
the text of the Sixth Amendment; under state law, the right finds its origins in the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment caselaw is included for a number of reasons.
First, and most generally, we attempt to illustrate the Supreme Court’s evolving view of the centrality
of the right to fair criminal and quasi-criminal process. Second, it allows for a more complete and
thorough understanding of how the doctrine might be applied to a wider array of criminal and quasicriminal factual scenarios. The Fourteenth Amendment caselaw is also useful simply because there is
more of it. Further, it presents more opportunities to refine the outer edges of the doctrine, since much
of the caselaw originates in state statutes addressing topics like delinquency proceedings, termination of
parental rights, failure to pay child support resulting in civil contempt, and transfer of prisoners to mental
health facilities. These are exactly the “shades of gray” factual scenarios that help to define and refine
the doctrine’s exact boundaries, both in terms of what qualifies as civil or criminal and in terms of how
expansive and inclusive the term “liberty interest” is. Finally, the inclusion of the entire body of Supreme
Court caselaw allows for a more expansive search to find a set of facts that parallel the actual
circumstances faced by UMs in a removal hearing, which, though termed “civil,” is better understood
as an amalgamation of civil and criminal components.
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A. Criminal Cases Almost Always Require a Categorical Right
UMs, a class of children whose plight closely parallels the dire conditions
faced by indigent criminal defendants, would derive the most benefits from a
categorical right to appointed counsel, a right which has taken many decades to
evolve even in criminal cases. At the time that the INA was passed in 1952, the
idea of the judiciary requiring appointed counsel to criminal defendants who
could not otherwise afford it was a relatively new concept.163 A criminal
defendant’s right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment—applied to
the States through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment—first
emerged and later was expanded to entire categories of defendants in the
Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 1930s.164
Powell v. Alabama was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to consider
whether due process requires the State to appoint counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.165 The Powell court held that State courts have a duty
to appoint counsel to criminal defendants charged with a capital offense who are
unable to make their own defense.166 Relying on, among other things,
defendants’ youth, illiteracy, ignorance, and distance from families and friends,
the court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without aid of counsel, he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge to prepare his own defense, even though he have
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.167
The Court underscored the importance of the right to be heard by counsel even
in civil cases, finding that the elements of a fair hearing would not be met if a
litigant were denied the right to be heard by counsel.168
If Powell alluded to the severe imbalance of knowledge, experience and
power that can often result for an unrepresented defendant in a criminal trial,

163. See Good, supra note 11, at 115–20 (summarizing the history of the source of the right to
appointed counsel in the criminal context).
164. Id.
165. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
166. Id. at 71.
167. Id. at 68–69.
168. Id. at 69 (“If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse
to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that
such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.”).
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Johnson v. Zerbst elucidated the injustice of having a trained and experienced
State attorney pitted against an untrained and unrepresented defendant:
[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the
lawyer—to the untrained layman—may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious.169
Relying on the discrepancy of power and knowledge between unrepresented
defendants and prosecuting attorneys, the Court thus held that all defendants in
federal criminal prosecutions have a Sixth Amendment right to court-appointed
counsel.170
The categorical expansion of the right to appointed counsel was short-lived.
In the early 1940s, Betts v. Brady,171 since overruled, adopted a case-by-case
approach to whether the Sixth Amendment should be applied to the States, citing
federalism concerns:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth
Amendment, although a denial by a state of rights or privileges
specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments
may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements,
operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth [Amendment].172
Betts made clear that the decision of whether to appoint counsel to criminal
defendants should be left to the States as a matter of legislative policy.173 Absent
a categorical mandate, courts over the next two decades employed a “special
circumstances” approach under Betts for determining whether appointed counsel
was necessary to ensure fundamental fairness in a criminal proceeding.174
The Betts court began carving out the nature of these special circumstances
in more detail. The defendant in Betts was accused of robbery and requested to
have counsel appointed for him for lack of funds. This request was denied, as
was custom in Maryland since appointment of counsel was reserved for cases of
murder and rape.175 In reaching the conclusion that the circumstances of the case
did not offend the Due Process Clause’s requirement of fundamental fairness,
Betts reasoned that the accused defendant’s age and average intellect, as well as
his previous experience of having been convicted of larceny in criminal court,
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
Id. at 463.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 471.
See Good, supra note 11, at 118.
Betts, 316 U.S. at 456–57.
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constituted the special circumstances that did not warrant state appointment of
counsel.176 Further, the defendant’s case was based on an alibi defense, and
“[t]he simple issue was the veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the
defendant.”177
The Betts approach prevailed for the next two decades, allowing States to
avoid having to categorically assign counsel to indigent defendants so long as
“special circumstances” were present. The “special circumstances” inquiry
allowed for a case-by-case application of the appointment doctrine in criminal
cases and was focused largely on two factors: the complexity of the issues at play
and the capability of the defendant.
This approach prevailed until the Warren Court had the opportunity to
expand the scope of appointment doctrine under the Sixth Amendment to a
categorical right. The Warren Court breathed life into the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by applying them, as
had been intended, to the States.178 Warren believed it was the judiciary’s
responsibility to enforce constitutional liberties and guarantees, and to take on
cases that addressed the social inequalities Americans were experiencing at the
time.179 He was clear in his position that the Constitution should be interpreted
in light of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”180
In 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright expanded the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to individual states. It found that the Sixth Amendment mandates a

176. Id. at 472–73.
177. Id.
178. In 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, where he remained until he retired in 1969. Chief Justice Warren presided over the Court during
a period of great unrest and uncertainty in the United States. The Fourteenth (and Fifteenth)
Amendments had created a series of rights and guarantees for African Americans that had been largely
unfulfilled in many Southern States, resulting in policies of systemic, institutionalized racism. The
demand for justice coalesced into a unified civil rights movement across the country. The Cold War and
the nuclear arms race were causing escalating tensions between Russia and the United States, and
McCarthyism had reached its heyday as congressional committees tried to root out communists and
communist sympathizers with little regard to civil liberties. For historical perspective on the Warren
Court, see generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial Guiding Principle:
Remembering John Rawls and the Warren Court, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 673 (2016).
The 14th Amendment was intended, among other things, to apply the protections of the
individual rights found in the 5th Amendment to the States, and to ensure that the Bill of Rights would
apply to state or local law and to all government actors. Id. at 707. “Yet by the time Earl Warren joined
the Court in 1953, only a handful of Bill of Rights provisions had been applied to the states. In the 18year span from when Earl Warren became Chief Justice until two year after his 1969 retirement, by
contrast, the Court incorporated an additional dozen provisions (mostly involving criminal procedure).”
Id.
179. See id. at 692.
180. Id. at 697.
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categorical right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants accused of a felony
in all state criminal cases:181
Not only [pre-Betts precedents] but also reason and reflection require us
to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him . . . That government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers
to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.182
Gideon notably defined a trial’s “fairness” directly in terms of the defendant’s
right to counsel. In other words, in a criminal setting at least, a trial would not be
deemed “fair” unless counsel were present to protect against the defendant’s
potential loss of liberty. Fairness had been functionally tied to the presence of
counsel for the purpose of leveling the playing field in adversarial situations
when an individual’s personal liberty was at stake. Despite officially coupling
its reasoning to the Sixth Amendment, Gideon nevertheless advanced some
support for an argument in favor of appointed counsel under the Fifth
Amendment due to both amendments’ concern for the underlying notion of
fairness.183
Argersinger v. Hamlin, decided just two years after Warren retired as Chief
Justice, was the highwater mark for the expansion of the right to appointed
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In that case, the Court held that
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants applied not just for felonies but
for petty and misdemeanor offenses as well.184 The Argersinger court reiterated
some of the factors it deemed paramount to securing a fair trial justifying the
appointment of counsel, including the prejudice that can accompany trials where
defendants are unrepresented, the deprivation of liberty involved, and the
accompanying harms to the individual that may result after imprisonment.185
The shift from a case-by-case approach in Betts to the categorical right to
appointed counsel established by Gideon illustrates one way that due process
181. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of using and extending the
logic of Gideon as an essential starting point to ensure fairness for removal hearings, particularly for
vulnerable groups, see generally Lucas Guttentag & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending the Promise of
Gideon: Immigration, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 39 HUM. RTS. 14 (2013).
182. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
183. See, e.g., Werlin, supra note 126, at 400 (“Although the Sixth Amendment did not apply to
deportation proceedings, the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Gideon lends support to a right
to appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment since both Amendments encompass underlying
concerns about fairness.”); see also William Haney, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 177, 184–85 (1970).
184. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34–37 (1972) (discussing the importance of and
concern for fairness, especially when considering the volume of cases and the need for speediness in the
misdemeanor docket).
185. Id.
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rights can evolve: categorical rights sometimes find their origins in the hardfought battles of highly vulnerable groups or individual defendants.186 What
begins as a right for some, can blossom into a right for all. As Justice Harlan
noted in the concurrence in Gideon, “The Court has come to recognize . . . that
the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special
circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.”187
Just three years after Gideon, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
again address the importance of fairness to the appointed counsel determination,
but this time in a civil context for precisely the group of particularly vulnerable
defendants whose rights are in question here: children.
B. Quasi-Criminal Cases, Especially for Vulnerable Classes, Sometimes
Require a Categorial Right
When civil hearings jeopardize the physical liberty of children in the same
way criminal hearings do, and the hearings are both adversarial and imbalanced,
appointed counsel is the only means of ensuring due process. Just four years after
Gideon was decided, the Warren Court extended the appointment doctrine even
further when it decided in Gault that children in state civil delinquency
proceedings should be afforded the same right to appointed counsel,188 not under
the Sixth Amendment but under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment instead. Even though the Sixth Amendment limits the scope of the
right to counsel to criminal defendants, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest
that if a civil proceeding implicated the same liberty interests as a criminal
proceeding, the same rights afforded to a criminal defendant must be provided
in order to comport with the minimal constitutional requirements of Due Process:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
“delinquent” and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The
child requires “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.”189
The facts of Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy named Gerald who,
while on probation for another offense, was accused of making lewd comments
via telephone to a neighbor.190 Gerald was immediately brought to a detention

186. See Good, supra note 11, at 119 (“The transition from Betts to Gideon indicates also that the
rights of particularly vulnerable defendants sometimes constitute the seeds from which a more robust
categorical right to counsel later sprouts.”).
187. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
188. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
189. Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
190. Id. at 4.
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home and held for at least three days.191 After determining that he was
“delinquent,” a judge committed Gerald to a juvenile detention home for a period
of six years until he was twenty-one.192 Appellants, Gerald’s parents, challenged
the constitutionality of the Juvenile Code of Arizona, asserting that Gerald’s due
process rights to receive notice of the charges, have the assistance of counsel,
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and refrain from selfincrimination were abrogated under the circumstances.193
Gault provides a succinct history of the development of the civil
delinquency system for juveniles. The delinquency system was developed on the
notion that children are “essentially good” and should not be made to feel that
they are under arrest or on trial in the same way that an adult would; in fact, the
rules of criminal procedure do not even apply in juvenile court.194 Instead, the
court was intended to act as a parent, and the child was to be “treated” and
“rehabilitated” rather than punished. Due process rights for the child did not exist
because the child had no right to liberty, but rather only a right to “custody,”
which the state could take over if the child’s actual parent had failed in their
duties and allowed the child to become delinquent.195
Throughout the opinion, the Court suggests that the touted differences
between civil juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal proceedings
may be little more than lip service to a gentler, rehabilitative justice system that
never existed. In fact, the Court minimized the significance of the civil
characterization of delinquency proceedings, referring to this endeavor as “[a]
feeble enticement of the ‘civil’ label-of-convenience which has been attached to
juvenile proceedings.”196 The Court noted that the judge’s interactions with
Gerald were hardly distinguishable from a judge’s interaction with a criminal
defendant.197 Further, the deprivation of liberty involved with commitment to a
delinquency home closely resembled a penal sentence in an adult penitentiary.198
Where defendants are highly vulnerable and a hearing is virtually

191. Id. at 6 n.2.
192. Id. at 7–8.
193. Id. at 9–10.
194. Id. at 15.
195. Id. at 17.
196. Id. at 49–50 (discussing the Fifth Amendment’s applicability to civil delinquency
proceedings and holding that the right against self-incrimination applies to children in such proceedings).
197. Id. at 28 (“Indeed, so far as appears in the record before us, except for some conversation
with Gerald about his school work and his ‘wanting to go to the . . . Grand Canyon with his father,’ the
points to which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that would be involved
in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute.”).
198. Id. at 27 (“The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving home’
or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated
for a greater or lesser time . . . . Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with
him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.”).
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indistinguishable from a criminal proceeding,199 due process will require
appointed counsel to protect the right to liberty, at least in the absence of a
knowing and intelligible waiver. In fact, just twenty-five years earlier, the court
had recognized that the vulnerability of certain defendants “by reason of age,
ignorance, or mental capacity” could compel heightened due process protections
like appointed counsel.200
Furthermore, while the premise of juvenile delinquency proceedings rests
on the assumption that the child is handed over to the State because parents have
failed in their duty to effectively perform their custodial functions, this clearly
was not the case in Gault. Appellants in Gault were Gerald’s parents, even
though the due process rights they sought to enforce belonged to their son.
Unlike in Powell, where family and friends were too distant to be of any help,201
Gerald’s parents were not just present but were closely involved and supportive
of Gerald at his hearings. Yet, parental availability and even Mrs. Gault’s actual
knowledge that she could have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing
were no substitute for the minimal requirements of due process:
Mrs. Gault testified that she knew that she could have appeared with
counsel at the juvenile hearing. This knowledge is not a waiver of the
right to counsel which she and her juvenile son had, as we have defined
it. They had a right to be advised that they might retain counsel and to
be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether they
did or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to
employ counsel they were entitled, in view of the seriousness of the
charge and the potential commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they
chose waiver. Mrs. Gault’s knowledge that she could employ counsel
was not an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment” of a fully
known right.202
Mrs. Gault’s knowledge of her son’s right to counsel did not suffice to satisfy
her or her son’s due process right. Even in a civil context and absent a knowing
waiver, children and parents must be notified that counsel will be appointed to
those who cannot afford it if the juvenile’s liberty may be severely curtailed.
The opinion also discusses the value of adversary methods in fact-finding
and distillation of the truth:
[T]he procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality
of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation
199. The Court says as much prior to reaching its holding that there is a right to appointed counsel
in delinquency cases: “There is no material difference in this respect between adult and juvenile
proceedings of the sort here involved.” Id. at 36.
200. See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948). The facts and circumstances in Wade led the
Supreme Court to hold that the district court made no clear error when it found that the failure to appoint
counsel for an eighteen-year-old when he was an inexperienced youth incapable of representing himself,
even when there were no complicated legal questions, was a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
amendment.
201. See supra discussion of Powell Part III.A.
202. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42.
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of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our
adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which
enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of
opposing versions and conflicting data.203
Where liberty interests at stake are vital and litigant capability is low, the
integrity of the fact-finding process is especially important.
The decision sharply criticized the Arizona Supreme Court’s argument that
parents and probation officers may be relied upon to protect the child’s best
interest.204 The court discarded the notion that a probation officer could ever play
such a role when they act as arresting officers, bring delinquency charges against
the child, and act as witness against the child.205 The court likewise dismissed
the judge as a potential child advocate since the adjudicatory procedure is in line
with adult criminal proceedings.206 Interestingly, the Court never addressed
whether Gerald Gault, who, in the court’s own words, “appear[ed] to have a
home, a working mother and father, and an older brother,”207 could have
effectively used his parents as advocates for his best interests. The Court’s
holding implicitly rejected this notion, however.
Under the facts of Gault, even when dedicated, supportive parents are
available to act as a child’s advocate, constitutional mandates of due process
require that attorneys alone are qualified to advocate on behalf of children in
civil hearings resembling criminal ones. In other words, Gault stands for the
proposition that a civil hearing that closely approximates a criminal proceeding,
in the magnitude of its physical liberty consequences, adversarial nature, and
serious imbalance of power and knowledge between state attorneys and a lone
defendant, must afford the same due process protections. This is particularly true
in quasi-criminal scenarios, where appointed counsel is required to level the
playing field to restore the element of fairness to the trial when the capacities of
the litigants are restricted.
C. Civil Cases Require a Categorical Right Much Less Frequently
The modern-day appointment doctrine and the requirements of a fair
hearing in the civil setting developed alongside the rise of the modern
administrative state, as an effort to guide courts in determining what procedural
process was due to individuals being deprived of a government entitlement or a
liberty interest.208 The doctrine is guided largely by Goldberg v. Kelly and
Mathews v. Eldridge, cases that dealt with the application of the Fifth

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
(2014).

Id.
Id. at 34–37.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 28.
See Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 288–89
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Amendment Due Process Clause in the contexts of welfare and Social Security
disability benefits respectively.209
While not dealing with the appointment doctrine per se, Mathews
nevertheless addressed the need for and the timing of evidentiary hearings in
disability cases.210 Further, it solidified a set of factors to be weighed and
balanced in ascertaining the adequacy of due process in administrative
hearings.211 Courts do not uniformly adopt and apply Mathews in appointment
cases, however, and the analysis in immigration cases often proceeds under the
Sixth Circuit test outlined in Aguilera,212 which relies heavily on Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, a Supreme Court case addressing the due process rights of a
probationer.213 A mix of approaches ensued, yet definite themes have emerged.
This Part identifies and integrates common strands running between distinct
factual circumstances and distills factors required to warrant a categorical right
to appointed counsel.
1. Gagnon, Aguilera, Mathews, and Lassiter: A Categorical Right
Hinges on a Loss of Physical Liberty
At issue in Gagnon v. Scarpelli was whether a man whose probation was
revoked required appointed counsel to ensure the fundamental fairness of the
hearing. The Court declined to find that the State was constitutionally obligated
to categorically appoint counsel, but instead adopted a case-by-case standard
because it was more flexible and because the Court found that the need for
counsel was the exceptional case rather than the rule.214 The Court provided
guidance to help identify those exceptional situations where counsel might be
required, stressing that counsel should be appointed in cases where the
probationer either denied violating probation or claimed circumstances that
might justify or mitigate the violation. The Court directed the decision-making
agency to take into consideration the complexity of—or difficulty in
presenting—the subject matter and probationers’ capability of speaking
effectively for themselves.215 The Gagnon decision supports an ancillary, albeit
implied, conclusion: if typical litigants in probation revocation hearings do not
require appointed counsel because the issues are not highly complex and they
are able to speak effectively for themselves, would a categorical right to
appointed counsel be justified if typical litigants in a group could not effectively
speak for themselves with respect to characteristically complex issues?

209.
(1970).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (summarizing Mathews v. Eldridge).
Id.
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 790–91.
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The Sixth Circuit in Aguilera adopted the logic of Gagnon’s case-by-case
approach in the removal context, holding that, for an indigent immigrant, the test
for due process “is whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be
necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process.’”216
Ultimately, the court found that an attorney could have done nothing to change
the final result that Aguilera should be deported because of his prior narcotics
conviction. The court, however, dropped a footnote of great significance, stating
that “[w]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present
his position adequately to an immigration judge, he must be provided with a
lawyer at the Government’s expense . . . Otherwise, ‘fundamental fairness’
would be violated.”217
Just two years later, Mathews directed courts to weigh three factors to
determine the sufficiency of due process in administrative hearings:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards;
and (3) the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
would entail.218
Where the procedural protection at stake is appointed counsel, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services adds a wrinkle to the Mathews calculus. Under
Lassiter, to find that an entire group of litigants has a categorical right to
appointed counsel, “[a court] must balance [the Mathews] elements against each
other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the presumption that
there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful,
may lose his personal freedom.”219 Lassiter was certainly controversial in its
holding that an indigent, uneducated woman at risk of having her child
permanently taken away from her, in an adversarial setting and pitted against the
state’s attorneys, has no right to an appointed lawyer.220 However, it reflects the
Court’s underlying views about appointed counsel—physical liberty is key to the
Court’s analysis when appointing counsel to entire groups of litigants in a civil
context.221

216. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790).
217. Id. at 568 n.3.
218. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
219. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
220. See generally id.
221. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Edward v. Sparer Symposium: Civil Gideon: Creating a
Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context: Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for
Appointed Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557, 593 (“In
withholding appointed counsel from the petitioner in Lassiter, the Court relied on a limited definition of
physical liberty. The Court cited selected cases which implied that, for due process purposes, the
deprivation of one’s physical liberty and personal freedom is generally associated with instances of
incarceration or civil commitment.”) (arguing in favor of a broader definition of physical liberty to
include bodily integrity and autonomy in the case of domestic violence victims).
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Textually, the right to counsel is enumerated only in the Sixth Amendment
in the criminal arena. Even there, the idea that criminal defendants have a right
to appointed counsel has arisen over the course of many decades as a judicial
interpretation of what fairness requires. Looking at the state of the appointment
doctrine from a textualist perspective, then, it becomes more apparent why a loss
of physical liberty is required before the Court will create a categorical right to
appointed counsel in civil cases, even if the facts of Lassiter were the wrong
opportunity for the Court to create this standard. Just like in Gault, the more
closely a civil case approximates a criminal one—vis-à-vis the loss of physical
liberty—the more apt the Court is to find the existence of a categorical right to
appointed counsel. Vulnerable litigants, complex legal issues, and adversarial
hearings characterized by gross power imbalances will provide more evidence
of a need to appoint counsel in a civil case.
Appointing counsel in a civil case is an uphill and, thus far, unprecedented
battle, as Justice Thomas recognized in the Court’s most recent appointment
doctrine case:
Despite language in its opinions that suggests it could find otherwise,
the Court’s consistent judgment has been that fundamental fairness does
not categorically require appointed counsel in any context outside of
criminal proceedings. The majority is correct, therefore, that the
Court’s precedent does not require appointed counsel in the absence of
a deprivation of liberty. But a more complete description of this Court’s
cases is that even when liberty is at stake, the Court has required
appointed counsel in a category of cases only where it would have found
the Sixth Amendment required it—in criminal prosecutions.222
Nevertheless, statutes can independently create an expectation of a liberty
interest. Stepping outside the scope of a purely criminal Sixth Amendment
context, we next address the treatment of state-created liberty interests and
evaluate the possibility of garnering a categorical right to appointed counsel in
such instances.
2. When a Positive Liberty Interest Is at Play
If a direct loss of physical liberty is difficult for a particular group of
litigants to establish, there may be another approach to elevate due process
standards required: by arguing for the existence of a positive liberty interest. For
the purpose of this article, we will define “positive liberty interest” in the same
way Professor Ann Woolhandler has, as “a liberty interest that derives from
nonconstitutional law, and particularly from statutes.”223 As Professor
Woolhandler correctly recognizes, the majority of the caselaw expounding on
the creation of positive liberty interests has been in the prison context, but she
222.
omitted).
223.

Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 454–55 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations
See Woolhandler, supra note 17, at 845.
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astutely identifies immigration statutes as having the potential to create positive
liberty interests as well.224
Courts have developed general guidelines for determining whether a
particular statute has created a positive liberty interest for prisoners where no
constitutional due process right had existed before.225 In Wolff, for example, the
Court found that prisoner have a state-created liberty interest in “good-time
credits” (credits for good behavior that can lead to shortening of the prisoner’s
sentence), which may not be revoked without appropriate due process
protection.226 Cases following Wolff have emphasized that, in order for a liberty
interest to be created, regulations should contain “specific directives to the
decisionmaker that if the substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome
must follow.”227 In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court reiterated the
requirement that state-created liberty interests generally should be limited to
regulations that contain language that guide discretion; going still further, the
Court required that the curtailment of liberty imposed by a prison regulation
“impose[] atypical and significant hardship on [the] inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.”228
Thus, even prisoners can have significant liberty interests. Most often, a
successful positive liberty interest argument is rooted in penal regulations or state
laws that alter prisoners’ expectations with respect to heightened restrictions
placed on their bodies or the terms of their confinement. Vitek v. Jones presented
a case highly analogous to the circumstances of UMs in removal hearings. The
Court considered a Nebraska statute that allowed prison officials to involuntarily
transfer prisoners to a psychiatric hospital upon a showing by a prison-designated
224. See id. at 846–48.
225. Addressing the validity of a positive liberty interest in the immigration context is in no way
intended to diminish the argument that a constitutional due process right exists for a recognized subclass
of unaccompanied minors.
226. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1974); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) (suggesting that a positive liberty interest relating to the conditions of prisoners’ parole
results in elevated constitutional due process protections).
227. See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989).
228. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Two different approaches have coexisted in
the prison setting, which has confused the liberty analysis somewhat. The first approach looks at the
nature of the liberty deprivation and its importance to the individual prisoner, while the second looks to
the expectations created by state law to determine whether a liberty interest exists. Id. at 481. Despite
this inconsistency, Sandin v. Conner made both of these approaches more difficult to establish. In
finding that no liberty interest existed for a prisoner transferred to 30 days of segregated confinement,
which would have triggered due process prior to Sandin, the Court elevated the standard for finding a
positive liberty interest. See id. at 479. For a discussion of state-created liberty interests in the prisoners’
rights setting, see, e.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 1557, 1567–68
(2008). The guidance of Wolff, however, remains good law even after Sandin. See Donna H. Lee, The
Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 809–34 (2004) (providing a comprehensive analysis of caselaw after Sandin,
contending that states have been left to consider state positive law without a thorough framework for
determining what constitutes an unconstitutional compulsion in the prison context, and stating that the
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied a broad, if inconsistent, method of identifying positive
state liberty interests.).
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physician or psychologist that the prisoner suffered from an intellectual
disability.229 While a prisoner should perhaps expect to be transferred between
facilities at the prison’s discretion,230 the Court reasoned that a transfer to a
mental hospital would go beyond the expectations of an ordinary prisoner.231 The
Court was one Justice away from appointing counsel for an entire group of
litigants due to the need for enhanced due process protections required by a
positive liberty interest.232 Justice Powell concurred in judgment but modified
the final order to require a categorical right to qualified assistance in the form of
mental health counselors, rather than attorneys, before inmates could be
transferred to a psychiatric hospital where they might be subject to involuntary
intrusions on their bodies as well as the stigma associated with commitment in a
psychiatric hospital.233 The Court relied heavily on the district court opinion,234
which found the statute unconstitutional for lack of adequate due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment after applying Mathews to
evaluate the competing private and public interests at stake.235
Vitek is instrumental in a number of important respects. First, it showed that
positive liberty interests can afford litigants—even convicted felons, who have
diminished liberty interests by nature of their imprisonment—heightened due
process rights. Second, it dealt with a vulnerable class of defendants (those with
potential intellectual disabilities). Third, it came painstakingly close to requiring
a categorical right to appointed counsel for indigent prisoners, instead requiring
appointment of qualified mental health professionals because the inquiry turned
on a medical question: whether the prisoner had mental health problems or
disorders. Finally, it expanded the scope of what the Court considers a “liberty
interest” for the purposes of the appointment doctrine beyond the traditional
concept of incarceration to encompass alternative concepts.236 Lassiter, while
creating a new presumption that a litigant’s physical liberty must be at risk to
justify categorical mandates for appointed counsel, does nothing to diminish the

229. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); see also Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D.
Neb. 1977) (quoting relevant language from Nebraska statute).
230. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976) (holding that transferring inmates between
prisons does not implicate the Due Process Clause, even if the conditions of the second prison are
substantially less favorable).
231. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 489–91 (“[I]f the State grants a prisoner a right or expectation
that adverse action will not be taken against him except upon the occurrence of specified behavior, ‘the
determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes criminal and the minimum requirements
of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.’”) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
232. Id. at 496–97.
233. Id. at 500.
234. Miller, 437 F. Supp. at 569.
235. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494–97 (discussing district court opinion in Miller, 437 F. Supp. at 573–
75).
236. See id. at 493–94 (involving the stigma arising from being classified as “mentally ill” as well
as accompanying involuntary psychiatric treatment).
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implication in Vitek that a loss of physical liberty (1) is not solely limited to
incarceration and (2) can arise from positive liberty interests.
Notwithstanding judicial reluctance to expand the appointment doctrine,
the courts have thus made clear that statutes can create protected liberty interests
where none existed before, resulting in additional due process protection for an
entire group.237 Once a liberty interest attaches, due process protections are
required to “insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”238 The
Supreme Court has yet to hear a case raising the issue of whether a categorical
right to appointed counsel can be based solely on a statutorily created “positive”
liberty interest. However, it remains clear that constitutional due process rights
can nevertheless be triggered and enhanced by such interests.239 A categorical
right to mental health counselors may have been the appropriate remedy for
prisoners contesting a mental health issue and standing opposite a medical expert
looking to institutionalize them. A categorical right to a legal advocate is
certainly the correct solution for UMs who expect protection under the TVPRA
from the dangers they face in returning to their homeland, and who stand alone
opposite government attorneys looking to remove them.
IV.
POSITIONING UM REMOVAL HEARINGS WITHIN THE APPOINTMENT DOCTRINE
LANDSCAPE
With the statutory bar to appointed counsel, now removed UMs as a group
require a categorical right to appointed counsel to preserve their right to a fair
hearing. Part IV will distill general themes from case law and present what we

237. See, e.g., id. at 488 (holding that a state statute created a liberty interest for a prisoner
threatened with transfer to a psychiatric hospital); see also Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.
1, 12 (1979) (finding that a state law created a sufficient expectancy of parole to give rise to a
constitutionally protected liberty interest with regard to parole decisions in a particular context);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972) (finding that a liberty interest was created by the proper
adherence to parole restrictions).
238. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488–89 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)). Wolff
held that a statute created a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause for prisoners whose
“good-time credits” could be taken away only for serious misbehavior. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
239. Assuming, arguendo, that a statute created a liberty interest that implicated the physical
liberty of similarly situated members of a group, the statute could hypothetically meet the Lassiter
presumption in the following way: just as a statute might fail due process scrutiny by not providing
minimal due process protections under the Constitution, so too could a statute bolster a liberty interest
for a group of people. Once liberty interests are legislatively bolstered, supplemental due process
protection must be provided before those interests can be taken away. In other words, the statute has
spawned a previously unrecognized due process right that could fairly be characterized as a “springing”
interest. See generally Vitek, 445 U.S. 480 (explaining that the statute created an elevated expectation
that prisoners would not be stigmatized and transferred to a mental health facility without supplementary
due process, and finding a categorical right to a qualified mental health professional to represent and
advocate for the prisoner); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (explaining statutorily conferred
property interest of welfare benefits triggered the issue of what process was due once the state decided
to confer these benefits).
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consider to be the best argument for securing a categorical right to appointed
counsel under the fair hearing provision.
A. Hearings Are Quasi-Criminal in Nature
Although removal hearings are classified as civil, they share substantive
similarities with criminal proceedings and carry comparable consequences. A
child suspected of being undocumented is placed under arrest and taken into
custody by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials or Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP) inspectors. The child is then processed in a similar
fashion to someone arrested for a crime—the child is fingerprinted,
photographed, and officially “charged” with violations of immigration law.240
The unaccompanied child, who is on average eleven years old,241 is informed of
their rights, including the right to counsel at no expense to the government.
Occasionally, payment of bond money is a condition of release. After the child
receives a notice to appear, which includes the charges brought against them,
they are expected to show up for a master calendar hearing. During this hearing,
the immigration judge decides, based on a series of questions and whether the
child admits to sufficient facts, if the child should be immediately removed or if
they are entitled to an individual hearing.242 Assuming they receive an individual
hearing, they are expected to prepare an opening statement, cross-examine
witnesses, prepare exhibits, and prepare a defense as to why removal is not
appropriate. In short, unaccompanied children are treated like adults in criminal
hearings that masquerade as civil hearings, but with no promise of legal
assistance.
A removal hearing lurks somewhere in the space between the civil and the
criminal.243 A good example of the quasi-criminal nature of a removal hearing
lies in the burden of proof required. The government must prove removability
by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.”244 This shows the unique
character of a removal hearing and its potentially harsh consequences, which
teeter somewhere between the criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” and the

240. See
generally
The
Removal
Process,
FINDLAW.COM,
http://immigration.findlaw.com/deportation-removal/overview-of-removal-procedures.html
[https://perma/cc/PA3T-AKHP].
241. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD MIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/child-migrants-to-the-united-states.
aspx#trends [https://perma.cc/X9DG-3TP9].
242. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. ATTORNEYS, REPRESENTING CLIENTS AT THE MASTER
CALENDAR
HEARING
1
(2018),
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rep_clnts_mstr_cal_hearing-20181220.pdf
[https://perma/cc/EUF6-6M54].
243. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011)
[hereinafter Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel].
244. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) (later codified under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) 2019).
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civil “preponderance of the evidence” standard. As the Supreme Court noted in
Woodby v. INS:
To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution . . .
But it does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from
this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence
case. This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that
may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our
Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign
land where he often has no contemporary identification.245
Here, the court seems to wrestle with the idea that immigration hearings change
lives so drastically but still yields to civil practice standards.
Throughout the years, courts have recognized removal as a very serious
consequence, characterizing it as a loss that extinguishes life and property.246
Relatively recently, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to characterize the
consequences of removal in Padilla v. Kentucky, further identifying the
difficulties that have plagued the courts in classifying the consequences that
immigrants face under the statutory scheme.247 The Padilla court reiterated the
severity of removal as a consequence, and, as a result, held that the right to
effective counsel requires an attorney to affirmatively provide advice related to
the deportation consequences of a criminal conviction.248 The Court used the
harsh consequences of deportation as a way to justify its holding, stating, “The
severity of deportation—'the equivalent of banishment or exile’—only
underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he
faces a risk of deportation.”249 Some have heralded Padilla as a breakthrough in
the Court’s rigid, formalistic characterization of removal as a purely civil and
nonpunitive consequence, and, at least for certain types of removal, as a signal
that the Court may be moving closer to recognizing the material similarities
between removal and criminal consequences.250
245. Id. at 285.
246. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[D]eportation may result in the loss
of all that makes life worth living.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922) (“To deport one who so claims to be a citizen obviously deprives him of liberty . . . .
[I]t may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”).
247. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
248. Id. at 373–74.
249. Id. at 374–75 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)); see also
Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) (“[D]eportation is a drastic sanction, one
which can destroy lives and disrupt families.”).
250. Compare Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel, supra note 243, at 1475
(proposing, in light of Padilla, an “Amendment V1/2” model to bridge the divide between the more
flexible due process standard used in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence used for civil cases and the more
specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to more fully recognize the reality that deportation
consequences—which are tied directly to the criminal justice system and are highly punitive in nature—
require an appropriate mix of the fundamental fairness required by the Fifth Amendment with certain
specific constitutional protections (like appointed counsel) due to criminal defendants), with Terri Day
& Leticia Diaz, Immigration Policy and the Rhetoric of Reform: “Deport Felons not Families”
Moncrieffe v. Holder, Children at the Border, and Idle Promises, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 181, 197–98
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To the extent Padilla has eroded the formal distinction between the civil
and the criminal in removal proceedings, courts have more room for flexibility,
the epitome of due process. As the Supreme Court has duly noted with respect
to the notion of due process:
Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but
fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. It is fairness with reference
to particular conditions or particular results . . . What is fair in one set
of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others.251
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine an eleven-year-old child who is
capable of taking advantage of the due process protections afforded to them, such
as notice to prepare a defense, the opportunity to speak on their own behalf, and
the right to cross-examine witnesses: each and every one of the “procedural
protections” afforded under the INA is meaningless to a child, who is incapable
of taking advantage of those protections without the assistance of counsel.252 The
“right to counsel (at no expense to government)” provision in the INA would
operate, in practice, to deprive unaccompanied minors of any possibility of a fair
hearing unless that phrase is interpreted as a “minimum” standard for all
immigrants without precluding the possibility for heightened safeguards under
the fair hearing provision in special cases or for certain subgroups.253 Congress
has explicitly provided for special protection of individuals who are unable to
take advantage of the enumerated due process rights without additional
assistance, evidencing intent to level the playing field for those incapable of
taking advantage of these rights on their own.254
(2015) (“Although [Padilla’s holding that noncitizens have the right to effective assistance of counsel
regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction] is a far cry from incorporating the
holding in Gideon v. Wainwright to immigration proceedings, the holding in Padilla clearly recognizes
that deportation is not merely a civil matter.”).
251. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–17 (1934) (affirming the lower court’s decision
that defendant’s absence when jury was shown the crime scene did not violate his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
252. Studies have shown that unaccompanied minors represented by attorneys are five to six
times more likely to obtain a favorable outcome allowing them to stay in the United States. See WILLIAM
A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW,
12, tbl.1 (2017) (summarizing outcomes for UAC initial case completion for period between July 2014
through June 2016); see also SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, TRAC IMMIGRATION, REPRESENTATION FOR
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2014) [hereinafter TRAC IMMIGRATION,
REPRESENTATION FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN], http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/371
[https://perma.cc/NG4C-8EDR] (citing 73 percent chance that unaccompanied minors represented by
attorneys between FY 2012–2014 were allowed by immigration judge to remain in the United States,
compared with 15 percent of those who remained unrepresented).
253. Apposite here is Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, which lays necessary groundwork for this
argument, by intrinsically connecting appointed counsel (or at least an appointed “qualified
representative”) to plaintiff vulnerability and reinforcing the need for greater degrees of equity,
stratification, and nuance in relation to the appointment doctrine. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, CV-1002211-DMG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
254. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2018) (providing deference to the Attorney General to
supplement due process protections to “mental[ly] incompet[ent]” individuals whose presence at a
removal hearing is “impracticable,” and indicating a legislative understanding of individuals with
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The Gault court aptly revealed that a civil hearing that is de facto criminal
both in practice and in effect cannot hide behind a “civil label-of-convenience”
for purposes of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.255 Nevertheless, although
Padilla helped to recharacterize removal hearings somewhat by acknowledging
the severity of removal consequences, courts have generally been averse to
expanding the scope of a civil right to appointed counsel beyond the limits set in
Gault, which addressed a juvenile delinquency proceeding.256 The framework of
the TVPRA has, however, extended to UMs a statutorily conferred liberty
interest designed to protect minors against certain crimes intended to do bodily
harm.257 Before statutory protections can be withdrawn, heightened due process
protection must be afforded to those whom the TVPRA was designed to protect.
B. UMs Have Been Granted a Positive Liberty Interest
Scholars have argued persuasively for a constitutional right to appointed
counsel for UMs. This argument is supported by jurisprudential developments
favoring a right to counsel for unaccompanied minors,258 the expansion of a
noncitizen’s constitutional interest in remaining in the United States,259 the
enactment of the TVPRA,260 and recent studies correlating the likelihood of

intellectual disabilities and a willingness to adjust due process protections discretionarily for such
subgroups).
255. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49–50, 62 (1967); see also Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation
Counsel, supra note 243, at 1502 (“Formal categories . . . have long been in some tension with vital
interests and basic human rights in deportation cases.”).
256. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 453–55 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
application of Gault, and concluding that Supreme Court decisions narrowly tailored the application of
Gault only to civil proceedings that are functionally equivalent to criminal ones, and to situations where
there is a clear deprivation of physical liberty under the Sixth Amendment).
257. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, § 235(a)(4), 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018)).
258. In A Child’s Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, Good uses Matthews v. Eldridge as
a framework to explore how the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine has made a strong case for the
right to counsel for unaccompanied minors. Specifically. Good explains how the Supreme Court has
effectively elevated the private interests of unaccompanied minors over the fiscal and administrative
burden to the government in a way that provides significant support for a due process right to counsel
argument for unaccompanied minors under Matthews v. Eldridge. See Good, supra note 11, at 127–48;
see also Turner, 564 U.S. at 447 (holding that asymmetry of representation increases the risk of
erroneous deprivation of rights and militates in favor of appointed counsel); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (recognizing right to counsel in deportation proceedings due to similarity between
criminal punishment and deportation); Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981) (holding
that both direct and indirect deprivations of liberty are private interests that weight the Mathews scales
in favor of enhanced procedural rights).
259. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (the “right
to remain in the United States may be more important to the [noncitizen] than any jail sentence”)
(quoting 3 BENDER, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 60A.01–.02[2] (1999)).
260. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 was meant to create basic
procedures to ensure the appropriate treatment of children in the immigration system and to enhance the
ability of our legal system to process these children in an orderly and efficient manner. See What are the
TVPRA Procedural Protections for Unaccompanied Children?, KIDS IN NEED OF DEF. (Apr. 1, 2019),
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success in immigration court with the presence or absence of counsel.261
Scholarship has converged mainly on a Fifth Amendment argument for assigning
counsel to guarantee due process protections.262 To date, however, courts have
been leery of accepting a purely constitutional argument that the type of liberty
deprivation associated with removal in the case of UMs is of a magnitude
required to justify a categorical right to appointed counsel.263 At least for a welldefined “subgroup” of immigrants, the Lassiter presumption may be overcome
by identifying a positive liberty interest, in spite of how courts characterize the
loss associated with deportation.
We propose that the TVPRA created a positive liberty for certain UMs who
enter the United States, and that UMs can find hope in overcoming Lassiter by
analogizing to the line of prisoners’ rights cases, particularly Vitek v. Jones.
Prisoners or parolees may have limited liberty interests due to convictions,
confinement, or parole, but liberty interests can be expanded by statute. UMs
could likewise make such an argument: federal statutes have created positive

https://supportkind.org/resources/what-are-the-tvpra-procedural-protections-for-unaccompaniedchildren [https://perma.cc/pl66-qyb8].
261. For a cohesive and complete summary of recent Supreme Court case law and an argument
for greater recognition of the right to appointed counsel in removal hearings, particularly for child
immigrants, see Good, supra note 11, at 127–48. See also Matt Adams, Symposium Issue: Civil Legal
Representation and Access to Justice: Breaking Point or Opportunity For Change: Advancing the
“Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 169, 172–75 (arguing that grave
physical liberty interests at stake and the compromised nature of vulnerable groups such as UMs require
appointing counsel); Hill, supra note 11. See generally Johan Fatemi, A Constitutional Case for
Appointed Counsel in Immigration Proceedings: Revisiting Franco-Gonzalez, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
915 (2016) (finding a constitutional right to appointed counsel after reanalyzing Franco-Gonzalez under
the Mathews and Turner due process balancing test). And, for recent studies correlating the likelihood
of success in immigration court with the presence or absence of counsel, see Stacy Caplow et al.,
Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel Removal Proceedings: New York
Immigrant Representation Study Report, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (2011–2012) (representation
increases success rates for non-detained immigrants in removal proceedings from 13% to 74%); Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 376 (2007) (finding that represented asylum applicants “win their
cases at a rate that is about three times higher than the rate for unrepresented [[applicants]”).
262. See, e.g., Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deportation—Is There a Right to Assigned
Counsel?, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289 (1975); Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Frank, The Right to Appointed
Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 445 (1984); Haney, supra note 183, at 179; Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation
Counsel, supra note 243, at 1502–03 (“[M]ost scholarship, cases, and much litigation strategy have
tended to focus more on the Fifth than on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation
matters.”); Werlin, supra note 126, at 400.
263. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Gonzalez Machado v. Ashcroft, No. CS-010066-FVS, at 10–11 (E.D. Wash. June 18, 2002); see also Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir., 619 F. Supp. 656,
659 (C.D. Cal. 1985). In Perez-Funez, the court found that unaccompanied minors had “substantial
constitutional and statutory rights . . . in spite of the minors’ illegal entry into the country.” Id. INS
procedures violated these due process rights because the procedures coerced unaccompanied minors
into choosing voluntary departure without first providing procedural safeguards to ensure that the waiver
of the right to a removal hearing, which accompanies voluntary departure, was valid. Id. at 664–65. The
court, however, flatly rejected the argument that unaccompanied minors have the due process right to
appointed counsel. Id. at 665.
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liberty interests that require heightened due process safeguards prior to their
abrogation.
The INA draws a distinction between “admission” and “entry” into the
United States. “Admission” hinges upon lawful entry—inspection and
authorization by immigration officials264—whereas the INA originally defined
entry as the “coming of an alien into the United States.”265 Assuming that this
distinction continues to be recognized, various provisions of the TVPRA and the
INA could be construed as implicitly allowing certain groups of UMs to “enter”
the United States.266 Beyond the “right to entry,” a detailed statutory scheme
creates a system for classifying and then transferring groups of UMs into
government custody, giving rise, once custody attaches, to a statutory liberty
interest.267 Further, courts have held that the TVPRA controls where it would
offer greater due process protection to UMs than the INA does, even in the case
of UMs who are apprehended at the border.268 This provides additional support
for the idea that Congress intended the TVPRA to augment UMs’ liberty
interests.
First, the INA contains a provision that could be construed as allowing UMs
to enter the United States. Section 212(d)(5)(A) permits the Secretary of
Homeland Security to parole individuals into the United States “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit” on a case-by-case basis.269
This provision has been used to allow entry to undocumented immigrants
seeking asylum in the United States.270 Unaccompanied minors often arrive
having escaped living conditions that could readily fall under the category of
“urgent humanitarian reasons”: high poverty, unemployment, and crime rates;
structural weakness in government; inequality; and risks posed by trafficking and

264. Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a)(7)(A)(i), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) (2018)).
265. Act of 1952, § 101(a)(13). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 struck the term “entry” from the INA. Courts, however, have continued to
interpret the term “entry” similarly to the original definition. See, e.g. Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 616 (1999) (discussing whether adjustment of status while within the United States constitutes
an admission for the purposes of Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, and noting that admission is
defined, in part, in terms of “entry”).
266. See KATE MANUEL & MICHAEL GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43623,
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN—LEGAL ISSUES: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
6–7 (2016) (pointing to § 212(d)(5) of the INA and § 235 of the TVPRA as ways for UMs to lawfully
enter the United States).
267. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018)).
268. See Santos v. Smith, 260 F. Supp. 3d 598, 610–11, 615–16 (W. D. Va. 2017) (finding that
the due process rights of an unaccompanied minor who was apprehended at the border had been violated,
in part because the TVPRA covered his claim, and the TVPRA does not distinguish between arriving
immigrants and those who are already present).
269. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
270. MANUEL & GARCIA, supra note 266, at 7.
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smuggling operations, among others.271 The types of evidence USCIS provides
as examples used to establish parole often parallel the very reasons UMs are
fleeing their home countries: credible third-party sources outlining the imminent
harm applicants would face in their home country (or other documentation
attesting to this), evidence of particular vulnerabilities, or evidence of living
conditions in UMs’ home countries.272
Second, and potentially more compelling, the TVPRA pledges to protect
victims of child trafficking, acknowledging the unique vulnerability of children
in removal proceedings and indicating an intention to afford certain categories
of noncitizen children enhanced due process protection with respect to legal
representation.273 Congress intended the TVPRA to extend enhanced protections
to a vulnerable population of children, above and beyond what the INA provides.
To the extent that there is any conflict between the two statutes, the TVPRA
should prevail to offer the UM augmented protection.274 Under the TVPRA, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must provide appointed counsel
for all children who are victims of mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking
and must “to the greatest extent practicable . . . make every effort to utilize the
services of pro bono counsel who agree to provide representation to such
children without charge.”275 The relevant provision states that Section 235 of the
TVPRA must be read in conjunction with Section 292 of the INA (the “privilege
of counsel” provision), but the TVPRA nevertheless appears to confer greater
due process protections to a group of UMs it has recognized as requiring
additional protection.
Section 235 of the TVPRA also creates a difference in treatment for UMs
from contiguous countries and noncontiguous countries. It requires that UMs
from noncontiguous countries be transferred to the custody of the Secretary of
HHS within seventy-two hours, after which the Department of Homeland

271. PAMELA LIZETTE CRUZ & TONY PAYAN, ALONE AND VULNERABLE: UNACCOMPANIED
MINORS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
AND
MEXICO
4
(2018),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research-document/382e8fca/bi-report-100918-meximmigrantchildren.pdf [https://perma.cc/24HS-SY3U].
272. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., GUIDANCE ON EVIDENCE FOR CERTAIN TYPES
OF HUMANITARIAN OR SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC BENEFIT PAROLE REQUESTS (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/guidance-evidence-certain-typeshumanitarian-or-significant-public-benefit-parole-requests [https://perma.cc/7C9R-69DR] (listing
examples of evidence that can be presented to prove that an individual qualifies to be paroled).
273. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, § 235(c)(5), 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2018)) (“[T]o the
greatest extent practicable and consistent with section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1362), that all unaccompanied alien children . . . have counsel to represent them in legal
proceedings or matters and protect them from mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking.”).
274. See, e.g., Santos v. Smith, 260 F. Supp. 3d 598, 610–11, 615–16 (W.D. Va. 2017) (finding
that the due process rights of an unaccompanied minor who was apprehended at the border had been
violated, in part because the TVPRA covered his claim, and the TVPRA does not distinguish between
arriving immigrants and those who are already present).
275. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5).

56

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1

Security’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) is responsible for placing
children in state-licensed facilities.276 Even children from contiguous countries
may end up in such facilities if such a determination has not been made within
forty-eight hours.277 These facilities “provide the children with classroom
education, health care, socialization/recreation, vocational training, mental
health services, family reunification, access to legal services, and case
management.”278 Congress has further tasked the ORR with either reuniting
these children with family members or sponsors in the United States, or
removing these children to their countries of origin using DHS immigration
officials.279 By allowing entry to UMs via statute, and then by entrusting the
custody and welfare of this group of children to the Department of Health and
Human Services, the government has created a positive liberty interest. UMs are
entitled to additional due process safeguards before this interest can be taken
away.
The TVPRA goes on to further separate treatment of UMs from the
“average” undocumented immigrant. Acknowledging that less adversarial
hearings are a more appropriate way of resolving asylum claims for UMs,280 the
TVPRA gives initial jurisdiction of children’s asylum claims to DHS asylum
officers rather than immigration courts.281 In fact, the TVPRA includes a

276. See generally 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2018) (discussing the transfer of certain UMs from the
custody of immigration officials to ORR custody).
277. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(4); see also 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (“There are transferred to the Director
of the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services functions under
the immigration laws of the United States with respect to the care of unaccompanied alien children that
were vested by statute in, or performed by, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (or any
officer, employee, or component of the Immigration and Naturalization Service) immediately before the
effective date specified in subsection (d).”). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the care
and custody of unaccompanied minors from INS to the HHS Director of ORR. Hill, supra note 11, at
45. This statutory mandate prompted ORR to create a new division called the Department of
Unaccompanied Children’s Services, which provided for the care and custody of UMs by contracting
with private facilities. For a review of care, custody, and representation under the TVPRA, see id. at 45–
52.
278. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
DIVISIONS—UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN’S SERVICES (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/
resource/divisions-unaccompanied-childrens-services [https://perma.cc/Q8AM-8S9P]. The recent
surge of unaccompanied minors has resulted in such overcrowding that DHHS has found it difficult to
meet even its own stipulated requirements. See Camilo Montoya-Galvez, New Pictures Show
‘Dangerous Overcrowding’ at Border Patrol Facilities in Texas, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dhs-inspector-general-report-reveals-squalid-conditions-at-migrantdetention-centers [https://perma.cc/9Q26-7DP4] (describing the grim living conditions found in
inspected detention facilities—among other things, a lack of clean clothes, hot meals and showers for
UMs—and multiple violations of maximum detention periods).
279. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra
note 278.
280. Recent studies have shown that the average UM is just eleven years old. See supra note 252.
281. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(3)(C). Unfortunately, however, these children are still made to
appear before an immigration court to express an intent to apply for asylum prior to going before a DHS
asylum officer. Wendy Young & Meghan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
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statutory provision on “[s]pecialized needs of unaccompanied alien children”
that recognizes and addresses the highly compromised nature of UMs in removal
proceedings and suggests an alternative set of regulations to govern a UM’s
claim for asylum or other relief from removal:
Applications for asylum and other forms of relief from removal in which
an unaccompanied alien child is the principal applicant shall be
governed by regulations which take into account the specialized needs
of unaccompanied alien children and which address both procedural and
substantive aspects of handling unaccompanied alien children’s
cases.282
The provision again sets UMs apart from other undocumented immigrants,
providing authority for special treatment given their special needs.
In spite of the courts’ reluctance to characterize removal as a depravation
of physical liberty under Lassiter, a positive liberty interest nonetheless exists
for UMs directly through federal statute. Additional due process protections are
necessary before these interests can be abrogated, just as heightened due process
protections extend to prisoners whose “good-time credits” have been revoked.283
Instead of “good time credits,” restrictions on parole, or transfer to a psychiatric
hospital, however, the state-created liberty interest in this case is the guarantee
that these children, of whom the state has now assumed custody, will be
protected from the evils from which many of them had escaped. The federal
government has undertaken to protect and has, in fact, taken into custody a group
of children with no ability to protect themselves.
The Department of Health and Human Services has an affirmative
obligation to safeguard the best interests of these children by not returning them
to situations where they will be victimized or harmed.284 The TVPRA and
accompanying regulations have created a reasonable expectation that UMs will
be protected from further bodily harm and abuse.285 Reconceptualizing the nature
of the liberty interest at stake is a fundamental step in shifting outcomes under
Mathews; indeed, courts have begun to acknowledge that the consequence of
removal could present a more egregious loss of liberty than incarceration.286 But
at least for UMs, a positive liberty interest under the TVPRA can only be assured
if the government provides counsel to ensure that UMs have a “reasonable
opportunity” to present their case under Section 1229a(b)(4)(B). Under Vitek, a
categorical right can emerge from a positive liberty interest; a mental health
representative was sufficient in Vitek due to the medical nature of the inquiry,

Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
247, 259 (2010).
282. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(8).
283. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 428 U.S. 539, 554–55 (1974).
284. See 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2018).
285. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(8); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 278.
286. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2011).
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but UMs require a legal representative due to the intensive legal inquiry inherent
in the removal process.
C. Even if Civil in Nature, Hearings Are Fundamentally Unfair
Especially with respect to UMs, who understand less but are offered greater
protection under immigration laws, legal assistance is required to navigate
complex and convoluted immigration system. This is particularly true when an
entire administration has openly and recurrently expressed antagonism toward
immigrants. The Trump administration’s 2017 Justice Department guidance to
immigration judges does not contain a section from a 2007 memorandum that
instructed judges to employ child-sensitive questioning tactics, like using short,
clear, and age appropriate questions and avoiding technical legal terms in lines
of questioning. The new guidance no longer cautions the court to be aware of
factors like post-traumatic stress, age, race, gender, and cultural sensitivity issues
when dealing with children.287 Guidance under the Trump administration instead
reminds immigration judges to expedite requests for voluntary departures of
UMs (departures from the United States without an order of removal) and
cautions immigration judges about the incentives children have to misrepresent
themselves as UMs, citing widespread fraud and abuse within the system.288
Within this political climate, the right to appointed counsel to protect a UM’s
right to a fair hearing is more critical than ever before.
The fairness of a hearing is predicated on factors discussed at length above
in Part III. Under Fifth or Sixth Amendment analysis alike, general factors can
be distilled and are frequently emphasized in both the criminal and civil context.
In addition to the nature of the liberty interest at play, these factors include: (1)
a high degree of issue complexity set against a low degree of litigant
capability,289 (2) the adversarial nature of and power imbalances characterizing
the hearing,290 and (3) the change in outcome that additional due process

287. Nicole Einbinder, How the Trump Administration is Rewriting the Rules for
Unaccompanied Minors, FRONTLINE (THE GANG CRACKDOWN) (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-trump-administration-is-rewriting-the-rules-for-unaccompaniedminors [https://perma.cc/J5HP-C4YM].
288. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM 17-03,
GUIDELINES FOR IMMIGRATION COURT CASES INVOLVING JUVENILES, INCLUDING UNACCOMPANIED
ALIEN CHILDREN 7–8 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/oppm17-03/download
[https://perma.cc/U95H-LCWR].
289. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (factors to be
considered in determining whether indigent parents in termination proceedings must have right to
appointed counsel for due process include “the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the
uncounseled parent”).
290. Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” To Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J.
FOR SOC. JUST. 169, 175 (“In any other context, the enormous liberty interests at stake, the adversarial
framework of the of the immigration court system, the complexity of the law, and the extreme imbalance
of power would almost certainly lead for case law providing for the right to assigned counsel.”); Amit
Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,” 33 GEO. IMMIGR.
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requirements would yield weighed against the accompanying burden on
government that additional requirements would create.291 UMs can make a good
showing that each of these factors supports a finding for appointed counsel.
1. Highly Complex Procedures and Low Capability Litigants
Immigration cases are more complex than most civil cases, and cases
involving children are inherently sensitive, as even the Trump administration’s
Justice Department has acknowledged.292 Navigating immigration statutes;
understanding the interplay between the TVPRA and the INA; and identifying
claims for amnesty, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,293 or other forms of relief
requires finesse, legal knowledge, and experience. Typical UMs have no
understanding of the legal claims or remedies available to them.294 Immigration
judges cannot substitute as advocates, particularly when they are directed to be
suspicious of UMs from the outset.295 Merging a high degree of complexity and
a low level of litigant capability generates the types of concerns that typically
trouble the courts in both criminal and civil cases.296
2. Hearings Are Adversarial and Exhibit Extreme Power Imbalances
Asymmetry in representation can engender a one-sided procedural
advantage for the represented party and arises frequently when assessing the
fairness of a civil or criminal proceeding.297 The lopsidedness of the hearing in
L.J. 261, 311 (“[I]n light of the power disparities between non-citizens and the federal government, a
non-adversarial process may be a better fit for removal hearings than an adversarial model.”).
291. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (discussing due process rights: “In
evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different
procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than
additional or different procedures”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”).
292. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 2 (“Immigration cases involving children are
complicated and implicate sensitive issues beyond those encountered in adult cases.”).
293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2018) (amending eligibility requirements of INA 101(a)(27)(J) and
status eligibility requirements of 245(h)).
294. See, e.g., TRAC IMMIGRATION, REPRESENTATION FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN
IMMIGRATION COURT, supra note 252.
295. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 288.
296. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (highlighting the centrality
of issue complexity and litigant competence as primary factors in the Court’s decision whether to appoint
counsel); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973) (same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462–63 (1938) (same); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (same).
297. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 446–47 (2011) (“[S]ometimes, as here, the person
opposing the defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel but the custodial
parent unrepresented by counsel. A requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial parent
in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that would ‘alter significantly the nature of

60

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1

the case of an unaccompanied child is as absurd as it is pitiful. In one corner,
government attorneys present evidence that the accused should be removed, and
an immigration judge hears evidence to determine the immigrant’s
“inadmissibility;” in the other corner, a fearful and confused child, who may not
even understanding the charges they face, is expected to find an affirmative
defense to removal on his own. The burden rests squarely upon the child’s
shoulders to identify and develop any legal argument for remaining in the United
States—the equivalent of formulating factual and legal defenses, without being
able to understand the rules. Litigants are similarly situated to litigants in
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, incapable of formulating a defense without
assistance.298
3. Risk of Erroneous Decision as a Function of Representation and
Accompanying Burden on Government
The hardship imposed on the government by adopting additional due
process protections and procedures for UMs has become a more difficult
argument for the government to make since the 1970s when Mathews was
decided. While the argument against appointing counsel because of government
cost has some validity, the TVPRA offsets this expense by allocating the costs
of representation to pro bono organizations whenever possible.299 The argument
that it is too burdensome for the government to identify UMs as a group
deserving special procedural accommodations has been significantly tempered
with advances in information technology since the 1970s.300 Storing, accessing,
and sharing data is commonplace not just in making eligibility determinations
for government benefits but for collecting and sharing information about
detainees in the immigration context as well.301 The Law Enforcement
the proceeding’ . . . [M]ak[ing] the proceedings less fair overall.”) (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787
(emphasis in original)); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462–63 (“[T]he average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”).
298. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, CV-10-02211-DMG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
299. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5) (2018) (noting that pro bono resources should be utilized “to the
greatest extent practicable” in providing counsel to UMs); see also VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FLOW
OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 24 (2012),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/the-flow-of-unaccompanied-children-through-theimmigration-system-a-resource-for-practitioners-policy-makers-andresearchers/legacy_downloads/the-flow-of-unaccompanied-children-through-the-immigrationsystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BY4-273J]. As Good has noted, even assuming, arguendo, that the
federal government picked up the entire cost of providing representation (which it is not legally required
to do under the TVPRA counsel provisions), the cost would be 0.1 percent of the annual case burden
under Gideon. See Good, supra note 11, at 140 (noting that between 6,000–8,000 UMs are placed in
removal proceedings each year, some of whom obtain counsel through pro bono organizations).
300. See Parkin, supra note 208, at 314–18.
301. In fact, there is an entire initiative (“Law Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative”)
devoted to expanding collaboration and information sharing between agencies responsible for enforcing
immigration law. The initiative uses a web-based data exchange platform to rapidly and efficiently share

2020]

UNACCOMPANIED MINORS

61

Information Sharing Service platform—currently used for sharing investigative
information between agencies to quickly identify patterns, connections, and
relationships between individuals and criminal organizations302—could without
much additional expense be used to identify UMs for the purpose of providing
them the additional due process accommodation of appointed counsel that they
so desperately need.
Alongside the diminished government burden accompanying recent
technological advances, the change in outcome as a function of legal
representation is evident. Studies have repeatedly shown that UMs fare far better
with a lawyer: according to Syracuse University’s TRAC data from the most
recent surge in UMs arrival to the United States (FY 2012 - FY 2014), 73 percent
of UMs represented by counsel were allowed to stay in the United States versus
15 percent of those unrepresented by counsel.303 These statistics make clear the
obvious benefits representation can have on removal case outcomes for UMs.
While cases that started in 2015 showed some promise in terms of numbers of
represented children (only three of ten children went unrepresented), cases that
started in 2017 were comparatively abysmal (three of every four children went
unrepresented).304
In both Turner and Lassiter, two of the leading precedents on the
appointment doctrine, the Court found that there was limited risk of erroneous
decisions due to the procedures used.305 In both cases, the Court noted that the
outcome might have been different if the facts had demonstrated a special need
for an attorney.306 UMs present the court with the set of facts that did not exist
in Turner or Lassiter—proceedings that are highly complex, governed by

and access data relating to, inter alia, immigration patterns and cases. See Law Enforcement Information
Sharing Initiative, U.S. IMMIGR. OF CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/le-informationsharing [https://perma.cc/P854-MU93].
302. See id.
303. TRAC IMMIGRATION, REPRESENTATION FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN
IMMIGRATION COURT, supra note 252; see also Good, supra note 10, at 145–46. Good provides recent
studies that identify success rates of represented versus unrepresented UMs as evidence that the risk of
erroneous decisions is extremely high for UMs who are unrepresented by counsel.
304. See SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, TRAC IMMIGRATION, CHILDREN: AMID A GROWING COURT
BACKLOG MANY STILL UNREPRESENTED (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/482/
[https://perma.cc/JX9G-7PHN].
305. See Good, supra note 11, at 142 (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447–49 (2011);
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28–29 (1981)).
306. Turner, 564 U.S. at 449 (holding that “[n]either do we address what due process requires in
an unusually complex case where a defendant can be fairly represented only by a trained advocate.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (“If, in a given case, the parent’s interests
were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their
peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to
appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.”).

62

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1

subjective standards,307 characterized by an adversarial fact-finding process,308
and reflective of egregiously disparate outcomes in represented versus
unrepresented populations.309
CONCLUSION
If the provisions in the INA were interpreted as intended, they would not
raise such serious due process concerns or need to be redrafted. Read in
conjunction with the TVPRA and alongside applicable case law, a “reasonable
opportunity” for UMs to present a case against removal necessarily requires
appointed counsel. Congress drafted the INA to embrace the flexible notion of
due process, and UMs have been granted a positive liberty interest to remain free
from abuse and bodily harm under the TVPRA. Given their inherent
vulnerabilities—combined with the adversarial and lopsided nature of the
hearing, the complexity of immigration statutes, and the disparate outcomes with
and without representation—a fair hearing requires nothing less than appointed
counsel to ensure that UMs have a reasonable opportunity to present their case
against removal.

307. Immigration courts face numerous challenges to objectivity, including lack of judicial
independence, high barriers to obtaining judicial review, politicized hiring of immigration judges,
widespread inconsistencies in decision-making, and the imposition of case load quotas favoring speed
over substance in case resolution. The American Bar Association has made a series of recommendations
to remedy many of these problems, but the subjectivity that currently penetrates the immigration courts
further underscores the need for greater due process protections generally. See generally AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, 2019 UPDATE: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES, pts.
2,
4
(2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_refor
ming_the_immigration_system_volume_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N8P-8c95].
308. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, , CV-10-02211 DMG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
309. See Good, supra note 11, at 142–47. Good distinguishes the facts of Turner from the those
of a typical UM, noting the complexity of issues in an immigration case as compared to a typical civil
contempt case. Good also describes the binary lopsidedness of removal proceedings as compared to
Turner, where the Court was concerned that categorically appointing counsel could sometimes give an
advantage to a litigant opposing a custodial parent who is unrepresented by counsel.

